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41-INTRODUCTION
This Management approach for EOS has been developed at the point where the United
States has completed 17 years of Space Technology experience. This period has been
characterized by tremendous space advancements, the most notable of which was the land-
ing of man on the moon. But equally or more complex and demanding in both the technical
and management areas have been the wide range of observatory, scientific and communica-
tion satellites that have been developed and launched. More than 700 Space launches were
made during this 17-year period. In short, the United States has met the challenges of
space and overcome many of its obstacles.
Included among the technical accomplishments during this period is the development
of Systems Engineering and System Management techniques, new standards in reliability
and quality control and further perfection of fabrication, integration, and testing techniques.
All of these elements have contributed to produce a wide range of hardware which is
qualified, tested, and proven for use in the space environment. During this time, hundreds
of thousands of people were trained to work in the demanding and complex space environ-
ment, and they have demonstrated their capability with a near-flawless record of space
flights.
We are now faced with new challenges to continue to advance technology and improve
management techniques in a new environment: that of constrained cost. The application
of the lessons learned during the early years of space are now being directed to this new
challenge.
This report recommends a management approach which will meet the challenge of a
constrained cost environment. The requirement of this study has been to explore manage-
ment approaches to achieve a low cost program. Suggested areas for study include con-
tracting techniques, test philosophy, reliability and quality assurance requirements, com-
monality options, and documentation and control requirements.
To prepare a data bank for management approaches, interviews were held with
personnel experienced in the management of programs covering a wide range of require-
ments and products. NASA, DOD, DOT and commercial programs were reviewed for
alternate management approaches.
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4Functional areas such as manufacturing, program planning and control, reliability,
quality assurance, test, contracting, subcontracting and configuration/data management
have been examined for alternate methods of doing business in a way that would result in a
lower cost or a more efficient program with emphasis on the requirements of a program
such as the EOS. A publication search has been conducted to determine what experiences
and recommendations would contribute to this study.
With this 'data bank' in hand, we have looked at the EOS program to determine which
areas may be most suitable for the application of alternate approaches, and what manage-
ment techniques could be applied to most effectively manage the program.
This report describes our recommended management approach, and is presented in
the following order:
* Section 2, Management Approach Recommendation Summary
* Section 3, Management Approach Recommendations
* Section 4, Management Approach Alternatives.
1-2

42-MANAGEMENT APPROACH RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY
2.1 PROGRAM APPROACH
We recommend that the Earth Observatory Satellite (EOS) Program and the follow-on
earth observation mission programs be conducted in a controlled target cost environment.
In this environment, the program approach must ensure program requirements are met
within allocated budgets.
Since the EOS program has relatively low production volume, and development cost
is a major fraction of total program cost, the recommended program approach is Design-
to-Cost (DTC) on a total Program Acquisition Cost basis.
The DTC program acquisition approach offers specific advantages in assuring that
essential program requirements are controlled within allocated budgets. This approach
requires innovative designs and functional concepts. It establishes the mechanism by which
cost visibility is provided both to designer and. management and requirements/cost incom-
patitibilies can be directed for higher level resolution. Cost/schedule/performance
tradeoffs are conducted above minimum essential performance requirements. The net
result is a lower risk program, and will maintain a total program cost within prescribed
limits by designing to established cost goals and trading performance against cost for
selected program requirements. This approach will reduce the cost of the EOS-A and -A'
development by approximately $11 million.
In the DTC approach, system definition studies will have established program require-
ments and DTC goals. Program requirements will be categorized as mandatory or desir-
able. The DTC goals will be target budgets for major program WBS elements, such as
Spacecraft, Instruments, Ground Station, Data Processing, etc. Where the program
implementation produces an out-of-tolerance condition, the problem will be resolved by
re-allocation between WBS elements and/or modification of desirable requirements. The
net effect will be to maintain a total program cost within prescribed limits by designing to
established cost goals, and trading performance against cost for selected program
requirements.
2-1
42.2 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
To manage the program implemented in accordance with the DTC approach, we
recommend a System Integration team headed by a centralized program manager which
we have designated as the System Integrator. This program manager, responsible to
the NASA/Goddard EOS Project Manager, is the system contractor for the Basic Space-
craft, Control Center and Mission Controls, Mission Peculiar Spacecraft, Central Data
Processing Facility and Low Cost Ground Station. In addition to the above responsibilities,
the System Integrator is responsible for assessing the performance of the Instrument and
System GFE contractors. The scope of this assessment includes cost, schedule, and
technical performance. Where cost, schedule, or technical problems develop that cannot
be handled within the latitude of the specific contract, the System Integrator will perform
an in-depth analysis of the problem, conducting cost/performance/requirements trades as
necessary. Resultant recommended program modifications to maintain total program costs
within established goals are forwarded by the System Integrator to the NASA EOS Program
Manager for review, approval and implementation.
2.3 EMPLOYMENT OF A FLEXIBLE SYSTEM INTEGRATION TEAM CONCEPT
We envision the System Integrator in his total program role functioning with a
working team. This working team, under System Integrator leadership, will include
personnel from NASA/Goddard, user groups, GFE contractors, and the instrument
contractors.
This team concept differs from normal management approaches in that it establishes
a working group with the most knowledgeable personnel from each of the participants in
the EOS program. Each member of the team will have his responsibilities defined, and
each will contribute to the program without duplication of effort.
Use of this working team will reduce documentation requirements because the
various program groups will be intimately involved in program assessment and modifica-
tion as active team members. Other advantages of this concept are shortened response
times, and ability to vary team mix as program focus varies through the program
phases. As a matter of fact, the System Integrator responsibility may very well be
assigned to other contractors for follow-on earth observation missions. NASA/Goddard,
System Integrator, and team member responsibilities will be detailed through contractual
interface documents and memorandum of agreement.
2-2
4Management of a DTC/Program Acquisition Cost program requires a total manage-
ment system for effective implementation. The management system must include a DTC
system whereby major WBS cost budgets are sub-divided down to the lowest level where
work is performed, namely: the Work Package Level.
The management system, in addition to the DTC system, must include a cost/
schedule control system and a technical performance measurement system. The
cost/schedule control system monitors, on a monthly basis, cost and schedule performance
at various WBS levels against established targets. Technical performance management
functions in the same manner, using technical parameters as target.
2.4 DIRECT USE OF NASA PERSONNEL IN SYSTEM INTEGRATION FUNCTIONS
We suggest that the System Integration team for EOS-A and -A' consist of approx-
mately 10 GSFC/NASA personnel who will contribute directly to the EOS system develop-
ment by performing portions of the system design and system requirements. This approach
will reduce the contractor efforts by approximately $1 million.
MODERATE SIMPLIFICATION OF CONTROLS, DOCUMENTATION AND TEST - The Sys-
tem Integration team will reduce the documentation necessary for visibility and control of
the EOS program by the Government. Documentation should be minimal and in accordance
with contractor formats for drawings, financial reports and failure analysis - to name a few
examples. The approximate savings for this approach is $1. 25 million.
LOW-COST MINIMUM RISK TEST PROGRAM - A low-cost test program, without high risk,
includes system and component environmental acceptance testing at the module level; the
basic spacecraft structure and modules are qualified for follow-on, as well as the basic
mission; and separate component and module qualification testing. This approach will save
$1. 8 million.
2.5 CONTRACTING TECHNIQUES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIME
CONTRACTOR
The contractual techniques recommended for the DTC EOS-A and -A' phase of the pro-
gram considers the cost risk of the major elements of the EOS program and shares this
cost risk between the Government and the contractor to reduce the program cost to the low-
est level. The EOS-A and -A ' phase is also planned to permit the introduction of production
procurements of the Basic Spacecraft and the Low Cost Ground Station and provides alternate
methods of future procurement.
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4The Instruments and the DMS operations for the initial flights are procured by the
Government and provided to the System Integrator as GFE. The System Integrator will
manage the Instrument contractors through the System Integrator team, and will resolve
interfaces within the team or by an Interface Board. For any problems requiring NASA/
Goddard Project Management approvals, recommendations will be provided by the System
Integrator and the Instrument contractor. The System Integrator will supply the necessary
assistance to the NASA/Goddard Project Manager for the procurement and interface to fully
integrate the Instruments into the DTC goals. This approach will reduce the program cost
for EOS-A and -A' by approximately $15.6 million.
The System Integrator is the prime contractor for the EOS-A and -A ' mission, includ-
ing the Basic Spacecraft, Control Center and Mission Control, Mission Peculiar Spacecraft,
Central Data Processing Facility and Low Cost Ground Station.
We recommend that this selection be made at the earliest time to begin the develop-
ment of the Basic Spacecraft and to establish the System Integration of the Instruments.
To expedite this selection, we recommend that a preliminary RFP be issued to the con-
tractors for comments. This review will provide a better understanding by Goddard and
the contractor when the official RFP is issued.
The competition for the EOS-A and -A' execution phase will be a management and
technical competition with the DTC goals fixed from information NASA has received from
the System Definition Study and the funds allotted for the program. Costs will be allocated
in this proposal to assist in understanding of the management approach. Total funding and
fiscal funding requirements may be established.
This contractual plan makes full use of a DTC philosophy and presents a low-cost
approach to the EOS-A and -A ' execution phase. It provides the structure to manage within
the program funding, and the flexibility to control within fiscal year funding. An early
selection of the System Integrator will assist in the Instrument procurement and assist in
optimum planning for the Basic Spacecraft. The development of a Basic Spacecraft will
also enhance future space programs by providing standard spacecraft hardware for low-
cost space programs.
2.6 CONTRACTING TECHNIQUES BETWEEN THE PRIME CONTRACTOR ANDSUBCONTRACTORS
Subcontracting will be conducted within DTC goals and desirable requirements will be
identified.
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4Because the seller assumes the highest degree of risk under fixed price contracting,
flexible type contracting should be minimized. Maximum use of "off the shelf" components
would appear to complement the use of fixed price contracting. Flexible-type contracting
would be used on a selective basis. Where practical, individual subcontracts would be
segmented to isolate the areas of uncertainty that lend themselves to flexible pricing; if
necessary, a delay in contracting of later phases until definition is sufficiently clear to per-
mit firm pricing is thus possible.
Pooling procurement of critical components common to several subcontractor's
equipment has been found beneficial from a cost, schedule, and quality viewpoint. In these
instances, Grumman and the Government can benefit from the lower cost resulting from
larger volume procurement, as well as maintain greater control over uniform quality of the
parts.
As part of the evaluation process of all seller proposals, a risk analysis will be pre-
pared. This analysis will identify specific areas of risk in schedule, cost, and technical
performance. In instances where competitive procurement is indicated, this analysis will
become part of the selection criteria. In addition, the analysis will provide the basis for
planning the procurements in a way that minimizes program impact.
To minimize total program cost by maximum use of available Government supplies
and services, the Government will be considered a potential supplier in areas such as
special test equipment, residual flight hardware, engineering services, and test facilities.
Program requirements in these areas will be by the System Integrator team to ensure taking
advantage of opportunities that may.exist. It is estimated that 10% of the procurement cost
may-be saved by this approach.
2.7 SUBCONTRACTING TECHNIQUES FOR THE MODULES
For the design and development of the modules, a comparison between development
by the prime contractor or by the prominent supplier of the module components indicates a
15% savings if the module is developed by the prime contractor. This is based upon data on
the EOS Attitude Control System Module. An additional 15% may be saved by substituting
components from a wide variety of suppliers. In the production phase of the modules, no
significant difference in cost is indicated.
2.8 MANUFACTURING
Manufacturing techniques and procedures recommended for the DTC EOS Program to
reduce the manufacturing segment of the overall program costs include support of Design-
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4to-Cost activities, maximum build for standard parts, use of a "limited production" manu-
facturing approach for small quantity parts, and a manufacturing Verification System to
increase personnel motivation to "do it right the first time."
2.9 TEST PHILOSOPHY
The test trade studies define and evaluate the influences of the EOS design and system
development approaches on the cost of Development, Qualification, Integration and Accep-
tance testing for the Spacecraft for the EOS Land Resources Mission and follow-on missions.
The significant areas of cost savings/impact identified by the test trade studies are:
* Savings of $500 dollars which represent 50% of the Environmental Acceptance
Test Costs at virtually no increase in risk, by combining all System and Com-ponent environemntal acceptance tests at the module level
* Modularity and follow-on mission qualification requirements add $125 thousand tothe qualification test cost; however, the flexibility and savings in total test costsprovided by the modular common spacecraft, over integrated dedicated space-
crafts for each mission, more than offsets the added $125 thousand in qualificationtest costs imposed on the basis EOS program.
2.10 DOCUMENTATION AND CONTROLS
The low-cost management techniques for documentation and controls will provide
NASA with visibility of EOS progress, and enchance mutual confidence without excessive
documentation and control. The recommendations will provide NASA with all of the basic
information it needs to measure and guide program performance, while simplifying and re-
ducing the correlary cost of documentation review, ordering, delivery, storage and re-
trieval, specification requirements, configuration baselining, and change control. Our
recommended use of the System Integrator team will reduce formal documentation to a
minimum and increase visibility to a maximum. Cost savings are approximately $1. 25
million.
2.11 BASELINES AND CONFIGURATION CONTROL
For optimum baseline, the recommendations for the establishment of the product
baseline are: Select the point in the program for establishment of the product baseline at
or near the point of design stabilization to avoid an unnecessary and burdensome change
mill. Dependent upon overall program schedule, portions of the system should be baselined
independently at an optimum point for that segment.
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42.12 MAINTENANCE OF COMMONALITY
One of the objectives of our study has been to provide a Basic Spacecraft which can
accommodate a variety of follow-on missions. This philosophy is carried through to all
aspects of the recommended hardware design, management approach, procurement plan,
and test philosophy.
The basic spacecraft design is flexible enough to support the LRM, Marine Resources,
Ocean Dynamics, Weather Observation and Transient Environmental phenomena. The rec-
ommended management approach provides a concept of a System Integrator which maintains
a nucleus of people supplemented by the various team elements dependent on the emphasis
of integration difficulty. The Basic Spacecraft contractor participation in the System In-
tegration Team assures the continuity of experience, test and checkout procedures and
techniques, and GSE from mission to mission.
2.13 SUMMARY OF COST SAVINGS
Table 2-1 summarizes the cost savings that will be attained in the categories de-
scribed in the foregoing subsections.
Table 2-1 Summary of Cost Savings
CATEGORY SAVINGS, $, MILLIONS
* DESIGN-TO-COST $11.0
* SYSTEM INTEGRATOR TEAM
- NASA PERSONNEL PARTICIPATION 1.0
- DOCUMENTATION AND CONTROLS 1.25
* TESTING 1.80
* GRE INSTRUMENTS & DMS OPERATIONS 15.60
TOTAL $30.65 MILLION
4T-1
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43 - MANAGEMENT APPROACH RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 PROGRAM APPROACH
It is recommended that EOS program and the follow-on earth observation mission
programs will be conducted in a controlled-target cost environment. In this environment
the program approach must ensure that program requirements are met within allocated
budget.
Experience has shown-that program requirements within specified ranges can be
obtained within specific budget costs. Although programs have achieved these results most
commonly through a Design-to-Cost (DTC) approach to unit production costs, they have
achieved similar results through a DTC approach for the total program. Since the -EOS
program has relatively low production volume and development cost is a major fraction
of.total program cost, the recommended program approach is Design-to-Cost on a total
Program Acquisition Cost basis. Program acquisition offers specific advantages to
insuring that essential program requirements are controlled within allocated budgets.
This approach requires innovative designs and functional concepts. It establishes the
mechanism by which cost visibility is provided both to designer and management, and re-
quirements/cost incompatibilities can be directed for higher level resolution. Cost/
schedule/performance tradeoffs are conducted above minimum essential performance re-
quirements. The net result is a lower risk program because of the
* Tendency to utilize proven hardware of known cost
* Flexibility to modify requirements and trade performance versus cost
* Synergistic effect of the two foregoing elements
* Active participation of customer personnel in performance/cost trades to assure
that maximum cost obligations are not exceeded.
The DTC/Program Acquisition Cost approach may seem to have the disadvantage
of discouraging incorporation of new technology into spacecraft applications. Obviously,
it requires frequent meetings and communication between customer and contractor,
contractor and his subcontractors, and contractor and associate contractors. Furthermore,
program requirements must be categorized as mandatory or desirable. Lastly, the DTC
3-1
4approach requires the availability and utilization of a management system to provide the
cost motivation and program status key.
Although on the surface a management system which requires relatively more disci-
pline and formality may seem costly, inhibit flexibility, and therefore be a disadvantage,
our recent experience with similar systems indicates the reverse is true. Our experience,
giving full consideration to the advantages and disadvantages of the DTC/Program Acqui-
sition Cost approach and the requirements of the EOS program/system, makes us recom-
mend the application of this approach based on its ability to best satisfy the particular
characteristics of the EOS program.
In our approach, system definition studies will have established program require-
ments and design-to-cost goals. The program requirements will be categorized as
mandatory or desirable. The DTC goals will be target budgets for major program WBS
elements such as Spacecraft, Instruments, Ground Station, Data Processing, etc. Where
the program implementation produces an out-of-tolerance condition, the problem will be
resolved by re-allocation between WBS elements and/or modification of desirable require-
ments. The net effect, then, will be to maintain a total program cost within prescribed
limits by designing to established cost goals and trading performance against cost for
selected program requirements. This approach will reduce the cost of the EOS-A and
-A' development by approximately $11 million.
3.2 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
The program, implemented in accordance with the approach described above, would
be managed by a centralized program manager whom we have designated as the System.
Integrator. This program manager, responsible to the NASA/Goddard EOS project
manager, is the basic system contractor program manager. He will have overall respon-
sibility for the basic system, including the Basic Spacecraft, Control Center and Mission
Controls, Mission Peculiar Spacecraft, Central Data Processing Facility and Low Cost
Ground Station. In addition to the foregoing responsibility, the System Integrator is also
responsible for assessing the performance of the Instrument and System GFE contractors.
The scope of this assessment includes cost, schedule, and technical performance. Where
cost/schedule or technical problems develop that cannot be handled within the latitude of
the specific contract, the System Integrator will perform an in-depth analysis of each
problem, conducting cost/performance and requirements trades as required. He will
then recommend program modifications to maintain total program costs within established
3-2
4goals to the NASA EOS Program Manager for review and approval, whereupon he will
implement them. The System Integrator concept will also be effective if any program
requirement or projected cost reaches an incompatible impasse. In this instance, the
System Integrator would flag the problem, identifying potential alternate solutions for
early corrective action by the NASA EOS Project Manager. This concept of program
management is shown in Fig. 3-1.
We envision the System Integrator in his total program role functioning through a
working team concept. Under the System Integrator leadership, this team will include
personnel from NASA/Goddard, user groups, GFE contractors, and the Instrument con-
tractor. This team concept differs from normal management "team approach" in that it
establishes a working group with the most knowledgeable personnel from each of the par-
ticipants in the EOS program. Each member of the team will have his responsibilities
defined; each will contribute to the program without duplication of effort. The team makes
it possible to address all functions of the EOS program, and either resolve program prob-
lems or conduct the in-depth analysis/trades necessary to formulate problem-solving
recommendations for the NASA/Goddard project manager. The team for EOS-A and -A'
is shown on Fig. 3-2.
The working team concept will reduce documentation requirements because the
various program groups will be intimately involved in program assessment and modification
as active team members. Other advantages of this concept are shortened response times
and ability to vary team mix as program focus varies through the program phases. As
a matter of fact, the System Integrator responsibility may very well be assigned to other
contractors for follow-on earth observation missions. NASA/Goddard, System Integrator,
and team member responsibilities will be detailed through contractual interface documents
and a memorandum of agreement. A typical distribution for several different missions
is shown on Table 3-1.
In addition to the normal expertise contributed by Government personnel, other
tasks directly applicable to the EOS program will be performed by Government team
members. Verification requirements definition/planning review, residual flight and
ground support equipment survey for EOS use, and cost effective utilization of Government
facilities are examples of the tasks which could be performed. This direct use of NASA
personnel will reduce contractor cost by.about $1 million.
Proposed utilization of Government facilities is the type of recommendation that
would be made to the NASA/Goddard project manager. The System Integrator and his
3-3
4team would also provide a central source of current program information to assist in
future mission planning by the NASA/Goddard project manager and other Governmental
agencies.
Management of a DTC/Program Acquisition Cost program requires a total manage-
ment system for effective implementation. The management system must include a DTC
system wherein major WBS cost budgets are subdivided down to the lowest level where
work is performed: the Work Package Level. The DTC system must provide budget
visibility for design, manufacturing, test and procurement personnel as well as program
management personnel. It must provide the cost visibility necessary for design iterations
and innovative trade studies to be performed to establish configuration and detail designs
that are consistent with allocated budgets. Designers must have total responsibility for
both cost and performance of their work packages. To efficiently carry out these respon-
sibilities, they are armed with tools such as Designer's Cost Manuals, Equipment Data
Bank, etc. These tools provide the designer with the capability to estimate the cost of
a particular design prior to release of a design for manufacturing, procurement, and
test activities. This system also provides the capability of flagging for higher level
action those areas where budgets/requirements are incompatible.
The management system, in addition to the DTC system, must include a cost/sched-
ule control system and a technical performance measurement system. The cost/schedule
control system monitors, on a monthly basis, cost and schedule performance at various
WBS levels against established targets. Allowable tolerances are established for each
target and related to the current, cumulative-to-date, and at-completion time periods.
If cost and/or schedule performance go out of the established tolerance, program manage-
ment must document the condition and successfully close it via a variance analysis report.
The technical performance measurement system is comparable to the cost/schedule
control system. Technical performance measurement parameters are established with
expected results and allowable tolerances. The particular parameters selected for
performance measurement include key parameters for items such as system performance
assessment, customer's performancepriorities, mission success criticality, and con-
tract demonstration incentives. These items are tracked monthly; the specific parameters
(for example, spacecraft weight, mean mission duration, power amplifier, power output,
etc) are measured against allowable thresholds. Out-of-tolerance conditions require
documentation and corrective action comparable to that of the cost/schedule control
system.
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4Table 3-1 EOS System Integrator Team Members, A Typical Distribution
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The management system operation for this approach, integrating the DTC, Cost/
Schedule control, technical performance measurement systems, is shown in Fig. 3-3.
While this program approach and management system should be applied to the total program
and to the major WBS elements, certain major WBS elements (such as the launch vehicle)
do not lend themselves to a DTC approach for program acquisition cost. Nevertheless,
this does not preclude handling the total program on the recommended approach, nor
does it exclude the application of this technique to those major WBS elements that do
require significant design and development.
We recommend that the existing format of the contractor's performance system
be utilized to provide the inputs required for the System Integrator program management.
Key elements in our program management are the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS),
the Program Schedule, and the Action Center. The WBS provides the basic task structure
to identify and define all program tasks and to establish summary levels for financial,
manpower, and procurement planning. Reports to NASA/Goddard for cost and schedule
performance, at one level below the Goddard project report to Goddard management, and
will be in accordance with the WBS. The WBS planned for the EOS program is detailed
in Fig. 3-4.
Relative to schedule, the EOS program has numerous interface functions that must
be defined to assure successful accomplishment. The System Integrator must be given
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the time to initially schedule the various activities so that an optimum schedule can be
established for each element of the EOS program. Planning must be based on realistic
schedules for the events and within the DTC funding goals. The System Integrator and
team members reschedule events, subject to NASA/Goddard project manager approval,
to perform within DTC goals and to adjust to program problems, funding constraints,
and user requirements. The recommended EOS schedule based on current program
assessment is shown in Fig. 3-5.
The Action Center is recommended as the most cost effective way to display EOS
program plans, status, and trends. This is a working session area displaying cost,
schedule, and technical performance data for the total EOS program. Here, lower level
WBS data is available to Goddard in support of the top level report.
3.3 CONTRACTING TECHNIQUES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE
PRIME CONTRACTOR
The contractual techniques recommended for the Design-to-Cost EOS-A and A' phase
of the program and shares this cost risk of the major elements of the EOS program and
shares this cost risk between the Government and the contractor to reduce the program cost
to the lowest level. The EOS-A and A' phase is also planned to permit the introduction of
multiple procurements of the Basic Spacecraft and the Low Cost Ground Station, and provides
alternate methods for future procurement.
The Instruments and DMS operations for the initial flights are procured by the
Government and provided to the System Integrator as GFE. The System Integrator will
manage the Instrument contractors through the System Integrator team and will resolve
interfaces within the team or by an Interface Board. For any problems requiring NASA/
Goddard project management approvals, recommendations will be provided by the System
Integrator and the Instrument contractor. The System Integrator will supply the nec-
essary assistance to the NASA/Goddard Project Manager for the procurement and inter-
face to fully integrate the Instruments into DTC goals. This arrangement will reduce
EOS program cost by approximately $15.6 million.
The candidate Instruments for the EOS program are in high risk and low risk
categories. The Thematic Mapper, HRPI, PMMR, SAR, SEOS and Solar Maximum
have a higher development risk; it is recommended that cost type contracting is appro-
priate. Instruments (such as the Data Collection System (DCS) and certain SEASAT
instruments) are of sufficiently low risk to procure by either a firm fixed price contract
or a fixed price incentive contract.
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4The Launch Vehicle, Shroud, FSS, MEMS and modifications to the Data Acquisition
Station are to be procured under the normal Government procurement practices. As
members of the System Integrator team, representatives of these procurements will
participate in the EOS program at the associate contractor level; the funding for these
efforts will be part of the System Integrator DTC goals.
The System Integrator is the prime contractor for the EOS-A and -A' mission,
including the Basic Spacecraft, Control Center and Mission Control, Mission Peculiar
Spacecraft, Central Data Processing Facility and Low Cost Ground Station.
We recommend that this selection be made at the earliest time to begin the develop-
ment of the Basic Spacecraft and to establish the System Integration of the Instruments.
To expedite this selection, we recommend that a preliminary RFP be issued to the
contractors for comments. This review will provide a better understanding by Goddard
and the contractor when the official RFP is issued.
The competition for the EOS-A and -A' execution phase will be a management and
technical competition. The Design-to-Cost goals will be fixed from information NASA
has received from the System Definition Study, and from the funds allotted for the pro-
gram. Costs will be allocated in this proposal to assist in the understanding of the
management approach. Total funding and fiscal funding requirements may be established.
A cost-type contract should be used for this procurement. In accordance with the
objectives of a DTC program, and as required by the System Integrator responsibility to
manage within the DTC goals, cost tradeoffs will be a continuous requirement. A specific
incentive goal could be provided for this management effort if it can be clearly defined
and measured, and will not hamper the trades which might be required during the program.
Several candidates for fixed price contracting are identified with alternate procure-
ment techniques. The Basic Spacecraft, Modules and the Low Cost Ground Station may be
procured by fixed price contracts following their development. For follow-on missions,
the Basic Spacecraft or selected Modules can be procured by the Government and supplied
to a System Integrator GFE (Option A), or a procurement package including drawings and
specifications which can be supplied for use by the System Integrator (Option B). The Low
Cost Ground Station can be procured similarly. The Low Cost Ground Station can be
procured by the Government for use by the users (Option A), or the procurement package
could be provided for the use of the user (Option B).
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4The DMS operations (including the Mission Control, Data Processing operations
and support) should be contracted by a time-and-material or labor-type basis. Each
contract should be by individual contracts, rather than by the System Integrator for
maximum direct procurement - a DTC approach is not of significant value during this
phase of the contract.
The overall contractual plan makes full use of a DTC philosophy, and presents a
low-cost approach to the EOS-A and -A' execution phase. The plan provides the structure
to manage within program funding, and flexibility to manage within fiscal year funding.
Also, an early selection of the System Integrator will assist in the Instrument procure-
ment as well as in optimum planning for the Basic Spacecraft. The development of a
Basic Spacecraft will also enhance future space programs by providing standard space-
craft hardware for low-cost space programs. Figure 3-6 presents the EOS program
development flow. A candidate for separate procurement is the Basic Spacecraft, which
may be developed earlier and separate from other elements of this EOS program.
3.4 CONTRACTING TECHNIQUES BETWEEN THE PRIME CONTRACTORS AND SUB-CONTRACTORS
Our review of subcontracting techniques and the goals of a DTC program has
resulted in the following specific recommendations for implementation of an effective
EOS procurement plan.
Changes are the most frequent cause of cost growth and schedule delays in major sub-
contracts. Changes are often the result of placing a priority on scheduling that appears
to justify incomplete requirements definition at the time of initial authorization to proceed.
A significant reduction in change activity can be achieved by delaying major, high-risk
procurements until the systems engineering effort has provided more precise performance
and interface requirements; this approach also reduces cost and provides significantly
more accurate schedule planning.
Since the seller assumes the highest degree of risk under fixed price contracting,
flexible type contracting should be minimized. Maximum use of 'boff the shelf" com-
ponents appears to complement this basic policy. In areas where development or
modification could make the use of fixed price contracting counter-productive in
terms of program interests, flexible type contracting can be selectively used. Where
practical, individual subcontract would be segmented to isolate those areas of uncer-
tainity that lend themselves to flexible pricing and, if necessary, delay contracting
of later phases until definition is sufficiently clear to permit firm pricing.
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4Similar to the problem regarding changes resulting from lack of complete
systems engineering and requirements definition at program inception, changes can
also occur as the result of a precipitous release of the production phase. Production
should be delayed until development testing provides clear assessment of the final design
configuration. Special emphasis should be applied to a careful review of produceability and
manufacturing processes prior to production release.
In concert with the policy of maximum use of fixed price subcontracting, the speci-
fications should convey maximum responsibility to the subcontractor. Maximum respon-
sibility is conveyed by a minimum of detail. One extreme would be to procure equipment
"suitable for the use intended "by defining "the use intended". Conversely as specific
design detail and other restrictive requirements are added, the prime contractor assumed
responsibility for the effect of this detail and creates a scope envelope that is more subject
to contractual change. However, all critical performance, test and interface parameters
will be clearly defined.
Experience shows that seller's responsibility for the successful performance of his
equipment can be effectively extended through installation and checkout in the end article.
This contrasts with the traditional method of basing acceptance upon inspection and test at
source or incoming inspection at destination. Selected sellers would be contractually ob-
ligated to provide personnel and equipment to participate in "shepherding" their flight hard-
ware through spacecraft installation and checkout.
Another method of providing motivation to selected sellers throughout their sub-
contract performance will be to provide seller opportunity to earn additional fee based
upon the performance of seller equipment in orbit.
Early and continuing emphasis will be applied to produceability. Initial design re-
views will incorporate specific attention to this discipline to ensure cost effectiveness and
uniform repeatability of the product. Manufacturing methods and processes will receive
early attention to provide confidence prior to production release.
An area of significant cost in major equipment procurements is documentation.
The traditional approach to documentation has been to pass down to sellers the appli-
cable portions of prime contract requirements, including format and depth of detail. We
recommend that documentation requirements for each procurement be "tailored, "taking into
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4account the specific use to which it will be put, quality, and extent of existing data and
formats currently employed by the seller that may differ from specification requirements.
Emphasis shall be placed upon the practical needs of the potential users and not on rigid
conformance to uniform standard requirements.
Responsibility for monitoring seller adherence to the quality assurance provisions
of a Grumman subcontract should rest with Grumman. Specifically, acceptance of an end
product at a seller's plant should be at the discretion of the Grumman quality assurance
representative. Providing secondary, overlapping responsibility to Government resident
quality assurance personnel duplicates effort that adds to the administrative costs of
the subcontract, provides dual authority for quality assurance decisions and often delays
critical deliveries.
Traditionally, payments to sellers under fixed price subcontracts are based upon
incurred cost (progress payments) or physical delivery of an end item. Neither of these
methods provide adequate incentive to the seller in meeting the early critical milestones
that are often not evidenced by physical deliveries, but which are critical to later equipment
deliveries. By selectively establishing payment schedules based upon achievement of key
milestones, the sellers are provided with an incentive to stay on schedule early in the
program.
If under the subcontract clause of the prime contract, the Government reserves
the right of prior approval in the placement of specific types of subcontracts, there
should be a time limit established for this approval cycle. This will permit more precise
scheduling of the procurement plan and will prevent delays that could ultimately effect
equipment delivery. A time period of 10 days, after which in the absence of disapproval
Grumman would be authorized to proceed, would appear reasonable.
Pooling procurement of critical components that are common to several sub-
contractor's equipment has been found beneficial from a cost, schedule, and quality
viewpoint. In these instances, Grumman and the Government can benefit from the lower
cost from larger volume procurement, and maintain greater control over uniform quality
of the parts. However, due to the administrative costs and contractual ramification on
our subcontract relationship this procedure would be employed on a highly selective basis.
As part of the evaluation process of all seller proposals a risk analysis will be
prepared. This analysis will identify specific areas of risk in schedule, cost, and technical
performance. In instances of competitive procurement, this analysis will become part of
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4the selection criteria. In addition, the analysis will provide the basis for planning the
procurements in such a way as to minimize program impact.
To minimize total program cost by maximum use of available Government supplies
and services, the Government will be considered a potential supplier in areas such as -spe-
cial test equipment, residual flight hardware, engineering services and test facilities.
Program requirements in these areas will be to ensure taking advantage of opportunities
that may exist.
Decisions by the program CCB must be made on the basis of firm economic con-
sideration. Where chariges affect subcontractors, firm subcontract commitment as to
price must be obtained prior to such decision. Budgetary estimates and lack of firm
technical definition contribute to unplanned cost growth and poor cost effective decisions.
3.5 MANUFACTURING
Manufacturing techniques and procedures recommended for the DTC EOS Program
to reduce the manufacturing segment of the overall program costs include support of DTC
activities, maximum build for standard parts, use of a 'limited production" manufacturing
approach for small quantity parts, and a manufacturing Verification System to increase
personnel motivation to 'tlo it right the first time."
Manufacturing works closely with Engineering in trading off alternate concepts and
configurations, and establishing DTC targets for the recommended configuration with the
aid of a Designer's Cost Manual. As DTC targets are established, a Manufacturing plan
for fabrication of EOS hardware is developed. At the conclusion of each phase, the
planning data is projected and documented for the implementation of each succeeding phase.
In the development phase of the EOS programs manufacture of small quantity parts
for the EOS program will use a 'limited production" manufacturing approach. The low rate
of manufacture permits use of the 'limited production" approach where in shop technician
skills and simple shop aids replace most of the formal detail and subassembly tooling.
Tools will be provided only when essential to ensure structural integrity, meet production
requirements, and maintain interface requirements between EOS modules and the EOS
Launch Vehicle.
EOS parts are designed to utilize prototype manufacturing techniques, with tolerance
based on prototype capabilities. Parts fabrication is simplified by producing sheet metal
and machined parts from full-scale mylar or dimensional engineering drawings.
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4Hydraulic lines are developed from template (soft tubing) lines that have been de-
veloped and verified on the vehicle to permit use of standard tooling available, and to
reduce project tooling requirements and associated costs. Electrical wiring will be
built up by attaching connectors to one end of wiring that has been cut oversize from
lengths established from engineering drawings. Final routing, bundling, and attach-
ment of remaining connectors/terminals will be accomplished directly on the vehicle
during final assembly. This approach has proved to be the most cost-effective on low-
quantity production programs.
MANUFACTURING MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS - Electronic data processing (EDP)
operating systems will be used on the EOS program. The overall systems encompasses
the capability to control either low-or high-rate production programs. Operating in a
reduced mode, the Manufacturing Operational Data System (MODS) provides the level of
accountability required for low-rate/volume EOS type programs without incurring the
high cost normally associated with major EDP systems. The MODS provides product
definition in an indented parts list (IPL) and supplies inventory control, part tracking
through fabrication, and automated work orders, kit lists, and back orders for assembly
work releasing, MODS also provides tracking for manual (prototype) work orders that
are released to initiate fabrication of parts.
CHANGE CONTROL - Minor changes to the EOS design may be implemented in
the shop by "red line" drawing changes which are made informally, with Engineering and
Manufacturing management concurrence on budget and schedule impact. The "red line"
changes are coded on the shop copy and immediately incorporated on the original drawing.
Engineering Orders (EO's) will be issued for more complex changes, including
the creation of new parts and/or assemblies.
MANUFACTURING VERIFICATION SYSTEM - The MVS increases personnel motivation
to 'tlo it right the first time". Under this system, technicians are issued personal certifica-
tion stamps that they use to indicate satisfactory completion and inspection of operations on
the work order. Items presented for acceptance are verified by a Quality Control inspector
with subsequent Quality Control inspection levels increased or decreased in accordance with
shop performance.
Performance in the shops is fed back to Manufacturing management for improvement
and corrective action. The verification system reduces inspection manhours up to 15%
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in areas under the system, reduces repair/rework activities, and increases the quality
of completed hardware.
3.6 TEST PHILOSOPHY
The total EOS Development, Qualification, Integration add acceptance test program is
shown in Figure 3-5. The approach shown ties in with the basic EOS test requirements
and trade studies documented in Report 3, Subsection 6.18. These studies examine the
alternative approaches to satisfying both the basic LRM mission and common spacecraft
test requirements at a cost saving of $1. 8 million.
3.6.1 RECOMMENDED APPROACH
* Combining all system and component environmental acceptance tests at
the module level representing a cost savings of $500 thousand, or 50%
per Spacecraft of environmental acceptance test costs over the conventional,
component and system environmental test approach, and at virtually no
program cost, schedule, or technical risk
* Qualification of the basic spacecraft structure and modules for follow-on
as well as the basic missions, to provide a level of design confidence which
permits NASA to take advantage of the cost benefits of a multi-buy Spacecraft
procurement plan. Based on subcontractors estimates for a 30-unit buy versus
a 5-unit buy this could represent a 20% cost savings in component costs alone
* Separate component and module qualification tests to ensure that component
qualification levels are adequate to cover follow-on mission environment
* Verification of the flight instrument and ground processing system compatibility
and functional performance, independent from the basic spacecraft flow, andproviding both a low cost approach to demonstrating the EOS mission-peculiar
hardware and software flight readiness as well as maximum Integration and Test
schedule contingency and flexibility
* Utilizing the high percentage of developed subsystem avionics hardware to permit
elimination of a costly bench or laboratory avionics development spacecraft
* Making the systems qualification spacecraft available for performing Shuttleground and flight EOS on-orbit resupply demonstration, and/or refurbishment
for flight
3.6.2 INTEGRATION AND TEST
BASIC SPACECRAFT 
- The I & T program for a typical set of EOS light hardware
is shown in Figure 3-7. The components are functionally tested at the subcontractor and
shipped to the prime contractor for integration into the modules. Once the modules are
integrated and functionally checked the modules are subjected to either acoustic or mechan-
ical vibration, two days of thermal cycling, and a six day thermal vacuum test to verify
3-21
4component and module workmanship. The current plan calls for serial testing of the
modules using the same Test and Integration (T & I) station and unique software interfacing
through the module remote decoders and multiplexers. Individual hardwired GSE is used
for module power and monitoring of hardlines during test. The non-mission, unique
on-board software will be developed, debugged, and qualified in the software development
laboratory. Integration of the flight software with the flight computer will be accomplished
during integration of the CDH module. Initial software required for the ACS processing
during ACS module tests will be simulated from the T&I station.
Upon completion. of the module level tests the subsystem modules will be integrated
together, and functionally checked as a system on the flight Spacecraft back-end. At this
point, we have a Basic Spacecraft ready for integration of the mission peculiar Instruments,
Instrument module, mission software; and Orbit Adjust/Reaction control system module.
MISSION PECULIARS - The Instrument, IMP and Wideband antenna will be tested
as a system at GSFC, using the IMS Primary Ground Station to demonstrate the flight and
ground system compatibility, and prior to integration of the Instrument with basic spacecraft.
Observatory/Control Center and Network compatibility will be demonstrated via RF
through the WTR ground station.
Integration of the mission peculiars could directly follow the Basic Spacecraft
buildup as shown in Figure 3-7, or be downstream with the Spacecraft held in controlled
environment storage facilities. In the typical flow and schedule shown, the next step
would be to integrate the mission peculiar hardware and software, and perform observatory
level systems performance tests, including EMC. The separation and solar array deployment
mechanisms are then tested. The solar array size, and potentially its deployment
technique, is mission peculiar; therefore, it is performed at this point in the schedule.
The separation test, however, could be performed earlier/but it is performed here as
a matter of convenience. Prior to shipment of the observatory of WTR for launch, a
workmanship acoustic test of the integrated observatory is shown. The observatory,
in flight configuration with the exception of pyrotechnics, will be transported to WTR
in the horizontal position. WTR prelaunch operations are scheduled for five to six weeks
as a target since no extraordinary tasks or special tests are required at the launch site.
Shuttle, Titan, and Delta launch vehicle flows all permit observatory integration
with the launch vehicle about 7 to 10 days prior to launch.
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43.6.3 DEVELOPMENT AND QUALIFICATION TEST
The recommended Development and Qualification test program for the EOS flight
hardware is shown in Fig. 3-8. Since it is a design goal to accommodate all missions
with the same Basic Spacecraft, the recommended test program considers the basic EOS
land resources mission configuration qualification as well as qualification of the Basic
Spacecraft for follow on missions.
The recommended plan provides for module, thermal development and structural
qualification testing at the module level. The thermal development tests are required
on at least two of the subsystem modules to verify the thermal analysis model. Acoustic
and mechanical vibration qualification tests are performed at the module level for two
reasons: to determine component environments seen during module tests so as to
evaluate module level acceptance test methods, and to qualify the basic module structure.
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4-8 Fig. 3-8 Flight Hardware Development and Qualification Test Summary
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43.6.4 SPACECRAFT
The same modules used for module level tests with the component mass represen-
tations installed will be used for vehicle level tests. The LRM OAS and IMP module
configuration will be used for Observatory Structural Qualification. OAS/RCS IMP
modules for follow on missions will be qualified where required at the module level.
The program requirements of Report 3, Appendix C call for vehicle static tests to verify
structural loads; however, based on the trades studies documented in Report 3, Subsec-
tion 6.18, a vehicle level acceleration is recommended as a more cost effective approach
to verifying the module and spacecraft static strength. An early acoustic and mechanical
vibration test is recommended for both the LRM and follow on configuration for two
reasons:
* Provide early verification of component environmental levels to preclude down
stream requal
* Permit an early evaluation of the total spacecraft environments vs the design
environment for the various configurations.
The Observatory model survey is required for the cantilevered and free-free
configuration for both the LRM and follow on configuration.
MECHANISMS - Qualification of the separation, and deployment mechanism as
well as the basic LRM solar panel structural design is achieved during the observatory
level qualification tests. Earlier in the program off line development tests of the mech-
anisms will be required to verify the basic design approach.
ANTENNA PATTERNS - S-Band, X-Band, andDCS antenna pattern tests are sched-
uled early after contract go-ahead to finalize antenna locations, and verify link analysis
for the LRM configuration. These models should be maintained to verify follow-on
mission antenna patterns.
OBSERVATORY SYSTEMS - Following the structural qualification the vehicle is re-
configured for Observatory Systems Qualification, including a qualification model LRM
instrument consisting of EMC, Acoustic, Thermal Vacuum, RFI and pyrotechnic shock
test. Vendor qualification components where available or a flight component are required
for observatory level system qualification. Three and one-half months of S/S module
integration is allowed for in the schedule to cover first-time integration of the subsystems.
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4Since paralled integration of the modules can be performed by time-sharing the T&I
station, this should be adequate to debug the Basic Spacecraft subsystems and test pro-
cedures.
Completion of system qualification tests permit the qualification components to be
refurbished for flight, or utilization of the entire qualification vehicle for the demonstra-
tion of shuttle resupply concepts in both ground and shuttle flight test.
INSTRUMENT INTERFACES - A Spacecraft simulator and the mission peculiar IMP
module will be required to support instrument manufacturers for functional interface
verification during instrument qualification and acceptance tests.
3.6.5 GROUND SYSTEMS AND INSTRUMENTS
Figure 3-9 shows the Ground System hardware and software flow for both the DMS
and Mission Operations Control Center.
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4INSTRUMENT DATA ACQUISITION - Instrument Data Acquisition during Observatory
Qualification and Acceptance tests will be accomplished via a low-cost Ground Station
front-end, which will be part of the T&I station. Observatory test tapes willlbe provided
to validate Low Cost Ground Station field site installations. Primary ground station-
observatory compatibility tests can be demonstrated by, testing the Instrument - IMP
and spacecraft simulator setup at GSFC prior to integration of the instrument with the
flight spacecraft, or by shipping the entire observatory to GSFC prior to delivery for
WTR for launch. The cycling of the Instrument, IMP and Spacecraft simulator through
GSFC was chosen since the total Instrument data train including RF is checked at minimum
cost without tying up the entire T&I crew and observatory. During Observatory Systems
Tests, Instrument performance will be evaluated by internal instrument calibration
monitoring at the T &I station, for both wide-band full data-rate operations and the Low
Cost Ground Station lower data-rate.
CONTROL CENTER - Control Center check out and personnel simulations training is
recommended to be accomplished by software simulation because it provides both maxi-
mum flexibility in schedule and follow on mission reconfiguration at minimum cost.
3.7 RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
The following approach is recommended to ensure the required reliability at the
lowest cost. The Reliability Program plan will be a single document including the site
plans; it would be updated as required by major changes, rather than undergo periodic
updating. -Program control and progress reports would be integrated into the design re-
views. Formal reporting would be limited to significant events and problem areas. Design
specifications will be prepared for each item of hardware at the system, subsystem, and
component level.
Reliability predictions will be performed as necessary to support trade studies,
maintainability analysis, and logistics planning. Updates will not be required for minor
design changes, and predictions will not be to detailed levels within black boxes. Complex
models internal to black boxes are expensive and are of questionable value.
FMEA's will be performed within the black boxes for all critical functions and to
the piece part level for hazardous and mission criticality failure modes only. Program
failure reporting and correction will be in accordance with contractor procedures.
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4Additional recommendations are to include launch critical GSE in failure reporting
system and selectively include other GSE. Implement a system to standardize design and
fabrication processes and standardize parts. Test requirements are recommended in the
test philosophy section.
The recommendations for Quality Assurance are:
* Test and inspection verification by Government inspection agency to be on a
post-audit basis to reduce cost and eliminate delay. Post-audit permits the
contractor to move ahead in the manufacturing/test cycle and monitored by the
Government Representative
* Determine traceability requirements on basis of need. Distinguish between
Critical Structural Items, Limited Life/Cycle Items, Matched Items requiring
replacement in pairs, and routine less-complex items
* Introduce a material review system tailored to the significance of defect and
item criticality. Delegate responsibility to a single authority. QA will imple-
ment corrective action. Government representative will exercise jurisdiction
on post-audit basis.
The contractor should select workmanship standards and will be subject to continuing
NASA review.
3.8 DOCUMENTATION AND CONTROLS
The low-cost management techniques for documentation and controls will provide
NASA with visibility of EOS progress and enhance mutual confidence without excessive
documentation and control. The recommendations will provide NASA with all of the basic
information it needs to measure and guide program performance, while simplifying and
reducing the correlated cost of documentation review, ordering, delivery, storage and
retrieval, specification requirements, configuration baselining, and change control. Our
recommended use of the System Integrator team will reduce formal documentation to a
minimum and increase visibility to a maximum, with the resulting savings of approximately
$1.25 million.
Our recommendations are summarized under the following categories: Documenta-
tion Requirements, Requirements Specifications, Baseline and Change Controls.
The first topic is the methodology of establishing the requirements for documenta-
tion in the first place, Subsection 3. 8. 1, "Requirements Establishment and Ordering
Techniques". The second topic is Subsection 3.8.2, "Documentation Formats and Man-
agement Systems Requirements" and finally, Subsection 3.8, 'Documentation Process-
ing and Review".
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43.8.1 REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHMENT AND ORDERING TECHNIQUES
The following recommendations address the area of documentation requirements
establishment and ordering techniques-:
* Limit the documentation ordered at contract award to the unique legally (procure-
ment regulation) mandated items, the key documents obviously required for
approval by NASA, and an accession list of all other data prepared by the
Contractor as a by-product of his work scope
* Conduct review and "tailoring" of documentation requirements such as financial
reports, to the specific program needs after contractor selection and before
finalization of the contract when the Contractor is free from the pressure of
competition and the NASA is freed from the requirement to keep things equal
between competitors.
* In lieu of requirements, provide a Government/Contractor review of documenta-
tion requirements concurrent with the technical design review process to scrub
'and revise the contract requirements as the program unfolds. Use an approach
wherein items that are "now apparently" not needed can be eliminated, and the
need for contingency items can be determined with greater accuracy.
* Encourage "data minimization" by providing flexibility within NASA as well as
the Contractor, for reduction of formal documentation in lieu of other means
of acquiring equivalent information.
3.8.2 DOCUMENTATION FORMATS AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
One reason that documentation costs are typically high is because of the expenditure
of resources to formalize reports, test data, specifications, procedures, manuals, and
plans. Documentation costs are incurred both directly and indirectly. The costs directly
associated with providing specified data, such as the in-house identification and validation
functions, are relatively obvious. Less obvious are the costs associated with require-
ments to comply with the multitude of management information and control systems which
may be required indirectly to satisfy individual data requirements.
We recommend that the rigidity of format be considerably relaxed. Data require-
ments should reflect the minimum acceptable documentation that will supply the user with
the depth and content of the information he needs. The Contractor should be able to
satisfy most of the requirements with information that is a normal output of the manage-
ment/design/development/production effort, using generally good business practices.
Face-to-face verbal discussion promotes the mutual trust, respect, and teamwork that
is essential to achieve EOS program objectives.
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4There are a number of areas where rigid format requirements can be relaxed with
no adverse affect on the contract performance, end product use, or supportability. One
area is the engineering drawing requirements.
Another area loosely falling under the category of format is the storage and retrieval
functions of documentation management and the media of transmittal.
Emphasis should be placed on maximum use of contractor format whenever it can
fulfill the "intent" of the documentation or system requirement of the Government.
Documentation requirements should take into consideration the regular review,
monthly status meetings, etc, which take place as a forum for transmitting the needed
information, rather than via formal reports. Minutes of such meetings could supplement
many "data items".
Utilize informal working documentation 
- the same material that the Contractor's
engineers used to make their decisions - in lieu of formal reports. Some examples. of
this information might be engineers notebooks, engineering layouts, and raw data sheets.
Good data need not be "pretty" to do the job, and NASA personnel are technically
competent to review the same data and make their conclusions in an "over-the-shoulder"
or "on-the-board" environment.
Specify engineering drawings to industry standards, or at the very most, Form II
Drawings to Industry Standards. The following modifications to normal drawings
practices are recommended:
* Use of Engineering layouts in lieu of formal assembly and installation drawings
* Elimination of margins and zones on engineering layouts
* Eliminating rivet length callout on drawings for rivets which measure less
than 1 in. long
* Less restrictive reproducibility requirements for paper copies - allowingfull legibility of first generation copies in lieu of fourth generation.
Replace conventional hard copy transmittal of documentation, wherever practicable,
with microfiche. This recommendation is particularly applicable in conjunction with the
deferred ordering or accessioning of documentation.
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4Do not implement requirements for more Quality Assurance imposed on documenta-
tion, and do not require DD-250's (or equivalent) for documentation. The recommended
direction is to reduce not increase this type of requirement.
3.8.3 DOCUMENTATION PROCESSING AND REVIEW
The documentation processing and review recommendations are:
* All contractual data/documentation requirements should be carefully screened
by NASA prior to imposition on the contractor to assure that documentation
that does not directly affect NASA's interests, or has a higher level require-
ment controlling it, be submitted for information rather than for approval.
* Only design concept drawings be specifically signed and approved by NASA.
Manufacturing drawings should not require Government Representative signa-
ture; such signature does not connote approval, and does not relieve the Con-
tractor of his overall responsibilities.
3.9 REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION
For a given procurement, be it NASA procuring from a contractor, or a contractor
purchasing from a subcontractor, the way that the requirements for the item being
purchased are specified can have a dramatic impact on the cost of the item. The cost
can be incurred to a greater or lesser degree dependent upon the choice of the type of
specification, the matching of the content to the specification function, and the level of
customer involvement and approval.
In addition to these factors, there are, of course, savings that can be realized by
intelligent specification preparation practices Which minimize the cost of maintaining the
documents as changes occur.
For our recommendation, we have focused on the following specifications:
* Development Specifications - Define the "design-to" requirements for an item
to be developed. The essence of this type of specification is the items per-
formance, form factor and other pertinent technical considerations
* Product Specifications - In addition to the performance and design requirements,
these specifications define the "build to" and "test-to" requirements. They may
be part II of a two-part specification, the first part of which is the Development
Specification
* Materials and Process Specifications - State the requirements for materials and
techniques and procedural requirements applicable to materials or fabrication
processes. These are subsiduary specifications which are referred to in the
higher-tier specifications, or on the implementing engineering drawings. Test
specifications are included in this category.
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Our recommendations related to specification-type and content are presented in
the paragraphs that follow.
Whenever possible, utilize Functional Specifications stating performance only as
opposed to Detailed Design Requirements in accordance with the following guidelines:
* Use Development (Design Control) Specifications for any item below the system
level whenever it is considered sufficient to specify performance only (as
opposed to fabrication)
* Limit use of Design Control Specifications to those items where it is necessary
to specify performance as a first step in developing a Product Fabrication (detaildesign) Specification. (The transition to a fabrication specification is greatly
facilitated by the existence of a Development (Design Control) Specification.)
Performance requirements should be stated in quantitative terms only, that is, in
terms of numerical inputs and outputs including permissible tolerances under various
operating conditions as applicable. This is the only way performance values and toler-
ances can be established and verified for use in the attendant test or checkout procedure.
In the case of the specification defining the preproduction configuration, these values
and their tolerances serve as the basis for establishing the performance criteria of the
equipment under the various environmental conditions of the qualification test.
Any development specification should be void of "how-to" design details. Such
details will only inhibit the designer's function by telling him how to do something instead
of stating the end result he is required to achieve. This type of information belongs in
the fabrication specification. The development specification should not contain philosophy
and descriptive matter; rather, it should devote itself to exact statements based on a
black-box concept (that is, list only inputs, outputs, and interfaces without concern for
principles of operation). One exception would be when, for a valid technical reason, part
of all of the detail design has to be dictated. In general, specification of design details
should be kept to a minimum.
Product Fabrication (detail design) Specifications are applicable to any item below
the system level (including computer hardware), and are oriented toward procurement of
a product through specification of primarily fabrication (detail design) requirements.
This _specification should be used for second source procurement or re-procurement (that
is, when it is necessary to make available a design disclosure package) to control the
interchangeability of lower-level components and parts, and when service, maintenance,
and training are significant factors. This specification shall state:
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4* A detailed description of the parts and assemblies of the product, usually by
prescribing compliance with a set of drawings
* Those performance requirements and corresponding tests and inspections nec-
essary to assure proper fabrication, adjustment, and assembly techniques.
In instances where a Development (Design Control) Specification has been prepared,
specific reference to the document containing the performance requirements for the item
shall be made in the fabrication specification. Tests normally are limited to acceptance
tests in the shop environment consisting of selected performance requirements and ver-
ifying tests. Preproduction-type or periodic tests to be performed on a sampling basis
and requiring service or other environment may reference the associated development
specification.
Eliminate "how-to" information from process specifications, leave the methodology
to the selection of the subcontractor. Whenever possible, reference broader NASA docu-
ments in lieu of contractor process fabrication.
A contractor process specification is required only when the customer specification
covering the applicable requirements is not detailed enough for the required process
control. The process specification is essentially a general specification; it is, therefore,
applicable only to the extent specified on the design drawing or in the equipment specifi-
cation. Manufacturing or process specifications should not be referenced to the point of
inhibiting manufacturing technology or initiative. By imposing detailed specifications on
sellers, for instance, the seller may be forced to depart from his normal methods with
no actual improvement in the end result. The emphasis always should be on design
conformance, not methodology, keeping in mind that the purpose of a drawing upon
Which the process specification is referenced is not to control production; rather, it is
to control the design configuration and to present the criteria for determining whether
the item conforms to the stated requirements.
Restrict the content of Preinstallation (Bench) Test Specifications wherever possible
to functional electrical and mechanical checkout instead of duplicating acceptance tests.
This practice will reduce actual test time as well as specification preparation and main-
tenance time.
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4Request the subcontractor to propose Verification (Test) Methods appropriate to
the type of equipment instaed of specifying them to him in detail. This procedure, par-
ticularly in the DTC environment, has several advantages. It enables the seller to
exercise his initiative, and it provides alternatives for the buyer when dealing with
several sellers in a competitive environment.
Encourage the reduction of testing, assessment, and analysis when advantage can
be taken of previous work of a similar nature.
Eliminate or greatly reduce, whenever feasible, general requirements or specifica-
tions for such things as Human Factors, Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, etc. Instead,
substitute broader functional requirements that give the seller flexibility in demonstrating
that he meets them. This approach will also reduce specification maintenance cost.
A general specification covers requirements common to two or more types, classes,
grades, or styles of products, services, or materials. It avoids repetition of common
requirements in other specifications. It also permits changes to common requirements
to be readily effected. General specifications may also be used to cover common require-
ments for weapon systems and subsystems, such as reliability, maintainability, human
factors, weight control programs, etc, as well as sealing, watertightness, and certain
finish requirements.
One of the most important things to remember about general specifications imposed
on sellers is that the temptation to re-organize the seller's house must be resisted. In
most cases, the sellers are capable of complying with general requirements imposed on
them. As a rule, it is far more economical to be general enough to enable the seller to
use his own detailed organizational setups and methods as long as he meets the end
requirements. To require the seller to do everything the buyers way can be phenomenally
costly. In addition, the use of general specifications require extreme care in the following
areas:
* Whenever reference is made to general specifications in equipment or other
specifications, such reference should be made by specific paragraph number.
Theoretically, it is true that if you say "welding shall be in accordance withSPG024", it is intended that the seller comply with whatever paragraph of that
specification deals with welding. He usually suspects, however, that the welding
requirements may be scattered (and, unfortunately, he is usually right). Thus,he hangs a high price tag on the item to cover the requirements that he hasn'tfound yet. Obviously, requirements traceability is greatly aided by referencing
specific paragraph numbers.
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4Unless general specifications are carefully written, it becomes difficult to
separate a technical task from its associated data task. If for some reason
the two tasks are not properly separated, a downstream economy measure to,
say, eliminate the data requirement may result in elimination of both tasks
without intending to do so, For instance, a general reliability specification
may contain a paragraph with the heading "3.2.1 Failure Analysis Report". If
both technical and the associated data requirements are stated in this paragraph,
elimination of the report requirement from the purchase order would automatically
eliminate the technical task of conducting failure analysis as well as the report.
To avoid this problem, the two requirements must be separated as follows:
"3.2.1 Failure Analysis"
"3.2.2 Failure Analysis Report.
3.10 CUSTOMER APPROVAL LEVELS
The following discussion of the appropriate level of approval of specifications follows
in general, the arguments advanced previously relative to kinds of specifications. Recog-
nizing that the degree of customer involvement in the affairs of a contractor is related to
the degree of risk that the Government can accept, we do not advocate reduction of Gov-
ernment cognizance over areas in which his interest is involved. Rather, our recom-
mendations deal with the review and approval of specification requirements which are a
level below those which protect the Government's interest.
The specifications at the subsystem level contain all of the performance require-
ments necessary for Government approval; the Government will accept or reject the
contractor's delivered items on this basis. There is little to be gained by Government
approval of specifications below this level. Surveillance and visibility can still be re-
tained, but the time-delaying repetitive effort in reviewing and approving iterating re-
quirements allocated to these lower levels can be eliminated. Government participation
in activities such as the contractor's configuration reviews and audits of his sellers can
provide a more meaningful barometer of design progress and requirements compliance.
Limit customer approval to system/subsystem level, with contractor control on
the black-box (equipment) specification level. This will provide greater flexibility
and timeliness in contractor-subcontractor relations, and will contribute to lower costs.
System and subsystem level specifications should contain only top-level performance and
interface requirements; lower tier documents are selectively more detailed.
3.11 BASELINES AND CONFIGURATION CONTROL
Our recommended approach for the EOS program is addresses configuration base-
lining and configuration control.
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4For optimum baseline, the recommendations for the establishment of the product
baseline are: Select the point in the program for establishment of the product baseline,
at or near the point of design stabilization to avoid an unnecessary and burdensome change
mill. Dependent upon overall program schedule, portions of the system should be base-
lined independently at an optimum point for that segment.
Since the program schedule itself is the prime cost driver in the change control
process, the program must be properly paced with regard to development effort and
design stabilization. This will be done by the System Integrator.
The System Integrator team will review, discuss and expedite change processing.
The team will screen potential changes prior to the commitment of them to proposal
preparation to determine if the contractor should proceed with further effort. Conference
calls between NASA/Goddard and EOS contractor program managers, with supporting
personnel in attendance at either end of the conversation, can be ulitized to minimize
travel and expedite change action.
While rigorous documentation of changes is necessary, we believe that an Engineer-
ing Change Proposal format that is the same as the paperwork used internally for change
processing can be utilized by the NASA. This format will be specifically tailored to the
EOS program and mutually agreed upon.
In the DTC environment, the System Integrator will find changes which reduce
cost to counterbalance proposed changes which increase cost. Cost versus performance
and requirement tradeoffs will be made continuously throughout the program.
Mutual confidence results from the identification and visibility of, and prompt
solution to, problems. NASA/Goddard knowledge that the contractor is not hiding prob-
lems, rather, his is solving them, as evidenced in the S. I. recommendations, will
enhance this confidence and make excessive documentation and controls unnecessary.
3.12 MAINTENANCE OF COMMONALITY
One of the objectives of our study has been to provide a General Purpose Spacecraft
which can accommodate a variety of follow-on missions. This philosophy is carried
through to all aspects of the recommended hardware design, management approach, pro-
curement plan and test philosophy.
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4The Basic Spacecraft design is flexible enough to support the LRM, Marine Re-
sources, Ocean Dynamics, Weather Observation and Transient Environmental phenomena.
The recommended management approach provides a concept of a Systems Integrator which
maintains a nucleus of people supplemented by the various team elements dependent on the
emphasis of integration difficulty. The Basic Spacecraft contractor participation on the
System Integration team assures the continuity of experience, test, and checkout proce-
dures and techniques, GSE, from mission to mission.
Our recommended procurement plan coupled with our test philosophy is designed
to provide for maintenance of commonality as well as incorporation of technology advances
without destroying commonality and interchangeability of the Basic Spacecraft approach.
The procurement plan essentially is designed to make the Basic Spacecraft a "MIL STD"
part, with first procurements involving the Basic Spacecraft design development, and
standard set of specifications for the EOS A and A' mission. Once the Basic Spacecraft
design is qualified and proven, the Government then has a Basic Spacecraft with proven
capability, and can then proceed to procure an inventory of spacecraft as funding becomes
available. Our test philosophy of qualifying at the component level, qualifying the Basic
Spacecraft to design limits, and acceptance testing of the Basic Spacecraft and modules
separately, allows technology changes to be incorporated, and out of production components
or piece parts to be incorporated within the "MIL STD" module specification with no total
Basic Spacecraft impact of equal requirements.
Our recommendation, therefore, is to select a design, management approach, pro-
curement plan, and test philosophy which in themselves support the basic objective of
maintaining commonality to reduce the cost of future spacecraft programs.
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MGMT APPROACH
ALTERNATIVES
44 - MANAGEMENT APPROACH ALTERNATIVES
4.1 CONTRACTING TECHNIQUES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIME
CONTRACTOR
To compare the alternate contracting techniques for the EOS program, the major
elements of the program are identified as follows:
Instruments, Basic Spacecraft, Mission
Peculiar Spacecraft, Control Center and
Mission Controls, Central Data Process-
ing Facility, Low Cost Ground Station,
Launch Vehicle, Shroud, FSS, MEMS and
the Data Acquisition Station.
These elements may be procured either individually or by a single procurement and
several alternates are discussed. For the purpose of presenting these alternatives, the
Launch Vehicle, Shroud, FSS, MEMS and the Data Acquisition Station are deleted, as they
tend to be procurements uniquely handled by the Government.
The first alternative is for NASA/Goddard to procure, through a single procurement,
the elements shown below:
Instruments
Basic Spacecraft
Mission Peculiar Spacecraft
Control Center & Mission Controls
Central Data Processing Facility
Low Cost Ground Station
This approach is preferable for systems development as the responsibility for the
total program rests with a single contractor. A single procurement reduces the cost in-
curred by the Government and Industry for the competition and administration of the con-
tract. As each procurement has an associated cost incurred by the Government and the
contractors, the cost associated with a procurement is minimum in this approach.
The highest risk element in the EOS program is the Instruments which require de-
velopment. For the System Integrator to contractually assume the contractual and techni-
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4cal risk associated with this procurement would add around 30% to the procurement costs
of the Instruments.
Therefore a second alternative is for the Government to contract
directly for the EOS Instruments and supply them to the System Inte-
grator as GFE with the System Integrator procuring the remaining elements.
NASA/Goddard
INSTRUMENTS SYSTEM INTEGRATOR
Thermal Mapper Basic Spacecraft
HRPI Mission Peculiar Spacecraft
PMMR Control Center & Mission Controls
SAR Central Data Processing Facility
SEOS Low Cost Ground Station
Solar Maximum
Data Collection System
SEASAT
MSS
This approach separates the high risk elements and distributes the risk between the
Government and the Contractor. The 30% increase in Instrument cost associated with this
risk in our first alternative is eliminated.
As this approach increases the number of procurements, those costs associated with
the procurement and contract administration are increased. As this cost involves Govern-
ment cost and Contractor cost, the value is not easily determined but it could be as little
as 5% or as much as 20%. In any event it appears to present a lower cost program than the
first alternative.
A third alternative has Goddard procuring the Basic Spacecraft, Control Center and
Mission Control with a single procurement and supplied to the System Integrator as GFE.
NASA/Goddard
SYSTEM INTEGRATOR
Basic Spacecraft Instruments
Control Center & Central Data Processing Facility
Mission Control Low Cost Ground Station
Mission Peculiar Spacecraft
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4This approach has the advantage of developing the Basic Spacecraft early if funds are
not available for total program funding. The System Integrator has the Instruments as a
cost driver which will increase their cost by around 30%. The multiple procurement will
also add 5% to 20% to the Basic Spacecraft.
The fourth alternative is to procure the Central Data Processing Facility and Low
Cost Ground Station separate from the System Integrator effort as follows:
NASA/Goddard
SYSTEM INTEGRATOR
Central Data Processing Facility Instruments
Low Cost Ground Station Basic Spacecraft
Mission Peculiar Spacecraft
Control Center & Mission Controls
The system responsibility for the Spacecraft and Instruments rests with a single con-
tractor and is beneficial for Satellite development; however, the increased costs for the
Instrument risks and the multiple procurement is about the same as for alternate three.
The fifth alternative is to have three procurements as follows:
NASA/Goddard
SYSTEM INTEGRATOR
Instruments Basic Spacecraft Central Data Processing
Mission Peculiar Spacecraft Facility
Control Center & Mission Control Low Cost Ground Station
This approach groups like procurements together and isolates the high risk and low
risks elements of the program. If 5% of the procurement costs is valid for multiple pro-
curements, this approach may be the lowest cost approach. However, if procurement re-
lated costs, contract administration and interface costs are 10% or more, this approach
could well be the most expensive.
As the costs of multiple contracts are not accurately predicted since no good data is
available, this comparison is not exact; however, it is believed that they are within reason-
able tolerances and valid for a comparison of the above alternates. Therefore from a cost
viewpoint, the second alternate appears to be the most favorable for the EOS Program.
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44.2 CONTRACT TYPES
The contract types available are: Cost Type, Fixed Price and Time and Material or
Labor Type contracts. The cost type may have a fixed fee, incentive fee, award fee or
some combination. Fixed price contracts may be firm fixed price or fixed price incentive.
Other variations are available but add little to this discussion. Some concerns in selecting
contract type are; whether the procurement fits the contract type, will the contract type
achieve the desired results and will the administration be excessive.
The possibilities of either cost type or fixed price for the design and development
and follow on is shown on Table 4-1. These initial possibilities are based on the technical
advancement of each element and follow-on procurement after development.
The cost type fixed fee contract has only normal administrative problems and is
simple but has not been accepted as a cost effective method.
Table 4-1 Contract Types
INSTRUMENTIEQUIPMENT/
FUNCTIONAL GROUP CPFF CPIF CPIF/AF FPI FP T&M
THERMAL MAPPER X X X
HRPI X X X
PMMR X X X
SAR X X X
SEOS X X X
SOLAR MAXIMUM X X X
DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM X X
SEASAT X X
MSS X X
BASIC SPACECRAFT & MODULES X X X O O
CONTROL CENTER X X X
MISSION CONTROL XO
MISSION PECULIAR SPACECRAFT X X X
CENTRAL DATA PROCESSING FACILITY X X X
LOW COST GROUND STATION X X X O O
KEY:
X D&D PHASE
O FOLLOW-ON
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The incentive contracts are aimed at adding incentives to the contractor. It may or
may not add incentive to the project people or it may cause program perturbations that are
not good for the overall program. The award fee adds some direct incentive to the project
people but also may be counterproductive because of its subjective nature. Administration
may be quite high.
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4Cost Incentives which are applicable to the EOS, System Integrator approach cover
three areas; the total program, the development phase and the production phase. An in-
centive may be provided for the system integration effort and a separate incentive for the
basic system development. An incentive program which would add emphasis to the produc-
tion phase of the basic spacecraft and modules is to establish a design-to-cost goal for the
production unit. The design-to-cost target would be used during the development stage and
the performance would be measured by the cost of the production units.
In the selection of incentives, the potential trade-offs which may be required during
the development must be considered in order that the incentive gains or losses do not jeop-
ardize the trade-off considered.
4.3 SUBCONTRACT MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
The basic and alternative techniques for subcontracting are shown on Table 4-2 with
the recommended approach printed in italics.
SUBCONTRACTING TECHNIQUES FOR THE ECS MODULES
The alternate methods of modular development are addressed for the development
phase and production phase. The development may be done by the prime contractor from
seller components and inhouse components or by the component supplier who has the bulk of
the module hardware having systems responsibility.
From data received for the-EOS, ACS module, the approximate cost of Systems pro-
curement is $7,500, 000 if procured as a new system. If the Systems Engineering and fabri-
cation is done at the prime contractor, costs are about $6, 500, 000.
In this instance a further reduction of approximately $1, 000, 000 in cost resulted from
selecting alternate components which meet the EOS performance requirements for a lesser
cost. The advantage is in being able to select components from a wide range of suppliers
and performing the design, integration and test by the prime contractor.
In the production of the ACS modules for the EOS the recurring cost is about the same
for either prime contractor or subcontractor production.
The development by the prime contractor, using state of the art components, has a
further advantage of focusing the development cost of modules in a single source, thereby
gaining maximum use of experience and techniques required for the development of modules.
For the EOS program, consideration should be given to singular module development
early in the program if funding is not available for Basic Spacecraft development.
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Table 4-2 EOS Subcontract Management Techniques
SUBJECT BASIC TECHNIQUES ALTERNATE TECHNIQUES
(1) SUBSYSTEM & COMPONENT * UNDER THE PRESSURE OF INITIAL SCHEDULE * DELA Y KEY HIGH RISK PROCUREMENTS UNTIL SYSTEM
PROCUREMENT/SYSTEM PLANNING, PROCUREMENT IS OFTEN INITIATED DESIGN PROVIDES CLEAR ASSESSMENT OF SUBSYSTEM
ENGINEERING PRIOR TO FINALIZATION OF SYSTEM DESIGN & COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS
* IN CRITICAL AREAS OF SUBSYSTEM AND COMPONENT
DEVELOPMENT LOCA TE SELLER PERSONNEL AT
GRUMMAN TO PARTICIPATE IN ESTABLISHING
REQUIREMENTS
(2) CONTRACT TYPE * WHERE DEVELOPMENT IS REQUIRED FLEXIBLE * ISOLATEAREAS OF DEVELOPMENTRISK & RESTRICT
TYPE CONTRACTING IS USED FOR THE ENTIRE FLEXIBLE CONTRACTING TO THOSE AREAS
PROCUREMENT "PACKAGE" * IF NECESSARY DELAY FINAL PRICING OF PRODUCTION
EOUIPMENT UNTIL DEVELOPMENT PROVIDES CLEAR
DEFINITION FOR FIXED PRICE CONTRACTING
(3) PRODUCTION RELEASE * DUE TO SCHEDULE DEMANDS SUBCONTRACT * COMPLETE QUALIFICATION TESTING & PRODUCEABILITY
PLANNING OFTEN REFLECTS COMMITMENT OF REVIEWS PRIOR TO PRODUCTION RELEASE
RESOURCES TO MANUFACTURE OF PRODUCTION
EQUIPMENT PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF DESIGN
& QUALIFICATION
S(4) SPECIFICATION FORMAT * PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATIONS CONTAIN HIGH * PROCUREMENTSPECIFICATION WILL CLEARLY DEFINE
DEGREE OF DESIGN DETAIL CRITICAL INTERFACE PARAMETERS & PERFORMANCE
CRITERIA ESSENTIAL TO TOTAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
& MINIMIZE RESTRICTIVE DESIGN
(5) HARDWARE ACCEPTANCE * HARDWARE ACCEPTANCE BASED UPON INSPECTION * ACCEPTANCE OF HARDWARE BASED UPON SUCCESSFUL
& TEST UNIT AT SOURCE &/OR DESTINATION INSTALLATION & TEST IN SPACECRAFT
* FUND SELLER PERSONNEL TOPARTICIPATEININSTAL-
LA TION & SPACECRAFT CHECKOUT
(6) FEE INCENTIVES * INCENTIVES WHERE USED NORMALLY APPLIED o PROV/IDES INCENTIVE BASED UPON PERFORMANCE OF
TO COST, SCHEDULE &/OR FACTORY TESTING EQUIPMENT IN ORBIT
17) PRODUCEABILITY * NO CLEAR PRODUCEABILITY REQUIREMENTS a ASSIGN PRODUCEABILITY PERSONNEL TO PARTICIPATE
DURING DESIGN & QUALIFICATION PHASE IN EARL Y DESIGN REVIEWS (BOTH SELLER & BUYER
PERSONNEL)
2 1(8) OPTION PRICING * NEGOTIATE FOLLOW-ON PRODUCTION AS * INCLUDE IN INITIAL PROCUREMENT OPTION PRICES
NEW PROCUREMENTS FOR FOLLOW-ON REQUIREMENTS
(9) DATA REQUIREMENTS * PROCURE DATA IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM * TAILOR DATA REQUIREMENTS TO EACH PROCUREMENT
STANDARD REQUIREMENTS * DEFINE DATA REQUIREMENTS IN TERMS OF USER
REQUIREMENTS
* USE EXISTING DATA IN SELLER FORMAT WHERE
POSSIBLE
(10) QUALITY ASSURANCE o SURVEILLANCE OF SELLER CONDUCTED BY * GRUMMAN ASSUMES TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
BOTH GRUMMAN & GOVERNMENT AGENCY SURVEILLANCE OF ITS SELLERS
(11) PAYMENTS a SELLERS SEEKING FINANCIAL RELIEF UNDER * PROVIDE MILESTONE PA YMENTS BASED UPON
FIXED PRICE CONTRACTING NORMALLY MEASURABLE COMPLETION OF KEY TASKS
RECEIVE PROGRESS PAYMENTS
(12) APPROVAL OF SUBCONTRACTS * PRIME CONTRACT DOES NOT SPECIFY TIME * PROVIDE LIMITOF 10 DA YS FOR APPROVING PLACE-
LIMITATION ON APPROVAL CYCLE MENT OF SUBCONTRACTS
113) PROCUREMENT OF CRITICAL * EACH SELLER BUYS SEPARATELY EVEN THOUGH * SELECTIVELY IDENTIFY COMMON HIGH RELIABILITY,
COMPONENTS CRITICAL COMPONENTS MAY BE COMMON TO COMMON COMPONENTS & HA VE
SEVERAL EQUIPMENTS GRUMMAN PURCHASE TO FURNISH CFE TO SELLERS
(141 QUALIFICATION UNITS * DELIVERED AS RESIDUAL MATERIAL AT CON- * SELECTIVELY IDENTIFY UNITS FOR REFURBISHMENT
TRACT COMPLETION FOR FLIGHT USE
(15) RISK ANALYSIS * COST, SCHEDULE, AND TECHNICAL RISK ARE * PROVIDESEPARATESCHEDULE, COST& TECHNICAL
CO-MINGLED WITH OTHER FACTORS IN THE RISK ANAL YSIS INDEPENDENT OF OTHER FACTORS,
PRE-AWARD EVALUATION TO BE USED AS A SELECTION CRITERIA & A BASIS FOR
PROGRAM PLANNING
(16) GOVERNMENT FURNISHED * GFE LIST DEFINED AND PROVIDED IN PRIME * CONSIDER GOVERNMENTASPOTENTIAL SUPPLIER
EQUIPMENT & SERVICES CONTRACT IN SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS FOR SUCH ITEMS AS
SPECIAL TEST EQUIPMENT, RESIDUAL FLIGHT HARDWARE
ENGINEERING SERVICES & TEST FACILITIES & SERVICES
DURING THE LIFE OF THE CONTRACT
117) CHANGES * ORDERED ON "FLY NOW, PAY LATER" BASIS * FIRM SUBCONTRACTOR COMMITMENTS MADE KNOWN
TO PROGRAM CCB BEFORE DECISION MADE TO PROCEED
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44.4 RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
RELIABILITY - The NHB5300-4 is used as a basis for comparison for alternate approaches
appropriate for the EOS Program.
The Reliability tasks listed in NHB5300.4 (lA) have been reviewed to identify those
tasks which can be performed in a more cost effective manner without altering program
risks. The three major areas investigated are:
Reliability Program Management
Reliability Engineering
Test and Reliability Evaluation
For these three areas all subtasks have been listed, the normal approach to fulfilling
the requirement briefly described, and any viable EOS alternatives with appropriate Rejec-
tion/Selection criteria discussed. The approach (normal or EOS alternative) selected for
EOS has been printed in italics in Table 4-3.
If all the alternatives blocked out are selected, an estimated 7200 man hours savings
can be realized without altering program risk.
QUALITY ASSURANCE - Alternates recommended to replace the requirements of NHB-5300
5300-4 (1B), are printed in italics in Table 4-4.
Quality Assurance Program Development - Procurement quality control requirements
will be "custom tailored" to the complexity cost of the subcontracted equipment.
Subcontractors for major subsystems will be required to follow the requirements
of QES-0001, "Quality Control Requirements for Major Subsystems"* In addition, all
other suppliers of materials, parts, and components will be required to follow QEC-002,
"Seller Quality Control Requirements".
Three levels of Quality Assurance Control will be established for equipment procured
for the EOS program. The most stringent level is imposed on new design hardware, a less
stringent level is imposed on Modified Off the Shelf Hardware, and the least stringent level
is imposed On the Shelf Hardware. Requirements for these levels of control will be tai-
lored and extracted from QES-0001 and QES-0002 or from any contractor document for
Quality Assurance.
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Table 4-3 Reliability Issues (Sheet 1 of 3)
TASK NORMAL EOS ALTERNATIVES REJECTION/SELECTION CRITERIA
RELIABILITY PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT
1A201 RELIABILITY PLAN DESCRIBES ACTIVITIES TO EN- A. DELETE PLAN A. THIS WAS REJECTED SINCE A PLAN SIGNEDPROGRAM PLAN SURE COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFIED BY THE GRUMMAN PROGRAM MANAGER
REQUIREMENTS IS REQUIREDTO AUTHORIZE, CONTROL, &
- UPDATED PERIODICALLY ORGANIZE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE RELIA-
- SEPARATE SITE PLANS BILITY PROGRAM
B. DELETE FORMAL PLAN REQUIRING B. WITHOUT APPROVAL NASA LOSES CONTROL
NASA APPROVAL OVER RELIABILITY EFFORTS
C. DELETE PERIODIC UPDATE. UP- C. UPDATE OF PLAN SHOULD BE UPDA TED AS
DATE ONLY AS REQUIRED REQUIRED FOR MAJOR CHANGES INSTEAD
OF PERIODICALL Y
D. SITE PLANS SHOULD BE INCORPORA- D. WOULD ELIMINATE SEPARATE DOC WITH
TED IN BASIC PLAN ADDITIONAL SUBMISSION & APPROVAL
CYCLES WITH NO LOSS IN INFORMATION
1A202 RELIABILITY CONDUCT REGULARLY SCHEDULED A. DELETE FORMAL REVIEW & CONTINUE A. SIGNI FICANT PROBLEMS MAY REQUI REPROGRAM CONTROL PROGRAM REVIEWS & SUBMIT RE- REPORT AND DAILY TELECON FORMAL REVIEWGULARLY SCHEDULED FORMAL
LAWRITTEN PROGRESS REPD ORTS. ALRE- B. DELETE WRITTEN REPORT & CONTINUE B. REPORTS REQUIRED TO DOCUMENT RE-
PORT DAILY BY TELEPHONE REVIEWS AND DAILY TELECON SULTS & ASSIGN ACTIONS
C. CONDUCT FORMAL REVIEW ONLY C. ALLOWS DETAILED REVIEW& CONCEN-
WHEN SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS OCCUR. TRATED EFFORT ON PROBLEM AREAS AS
CONTINUE DAILY TELECON. NO REQUIRED. HOWEVER, RESULTS SHOULD
FORMAL REPORTS REQUIRE REPORT
D. CONDUCT FORMAL REVIEWS ONLY AT D. DOES NOT ALLOW FOR REVIEW IFSIGNIFI-
MAJOR PROGRAM MILESTONES. NO CANT PROBLEMS ARISE. RESULTS NOT
FORMAL REPORTING, CONTINUE DOCUMENTED
DAILY TELECON
E. INTEGRATE WITH DESIGN REVIEW& E. ALLOWS ADEQUATE REVIEW& AUDIT OF
CONDUCT ADDITIONAL REVIEWS RELIABILITY PROGRESS & IS COORDINATED
ONLY WHEN SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WITH OTHER PROGRAM EFFORTS. FLEXIBLE
OCCUR IN THAT SIGNIFICANT PROBL EMS CAN BE
ADEQUATELY RESEARCHED, REVIEWED &
SPECIFIC ACTION ITEMS GENERATED
1A203 RELIABILITY REPORT PERIODICALLY ON THE PRO- A. DELETE FORMAL REPORTING A. WITHOUT REPORTS RESULTS NOT DOCU-
PROGRESS REPORTING GRESS OF THE RELIABILITY NIENTED & ACTION NOT ASSIGNED
PROGRAM B. LIMIT FORMAL REPORTING TOS/GNI- B. WILL GIVE THE REQUIRED VISIBILITY TO
- WRITTEN PROGRESS REPORTS FICANTEVENTS & PROBLEM AREAS NASA ON MAJOR EVENTS WITHOUT TECH-
- RELIABILITY PROGRAM NICAL COMPROMISE
CONTROL REPORTS
1A204 RELIABILITY PROVIDE TRAINING & INDOCTRINA- A. DELETE FORMAL TRAINING A. GRUMMAN WILL APPLY ITS FIFTEEN YEARS
TRAINING TION IN TECHNOLOGIES & TECHNIQUE OF SUCCESSFUL SPACE RELIABILITY PRO-
PECULIAR TO THE PROGRAM GRAM EXPERIENCE TO PLAN & CONDUCT
AN EFFECTIVE RELIABILITY PROGRAM
FOR EOS
1A205 SUPPLIER CONTROL ENSURE THAT THE RELIABILITY OF
SYSTEM ELEMENTS OBTAINED FROM
SUBCONTRACTORS & SUPPLIERS
MEETS THE RELIABILITY REQUIRE-
MENT OF THE OVERALL SYSTEM
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Table 4-3 Reliability Issues (Sheet 2 of 3)
TASK NORMAL EOS ALTERNATIVES REJECTION/SELECTION CRITERIA
MANAGEMENT (CONT)
1A206 RELIABILITY OF IDENTIFY RELIABILITY DATA NEEDED
GFE ON GFE & WHERE DATA SHOWS INCON-
SISTENCY OF THE GFE WITH RELIA-
BILITY. REQUIREMENTS OF OVER-
ALL SYSTEM, NASA SHALL BE FOR-
MALL YAND PROMPTLY NOTIFIED
RELIABILITY
ENGINEERING
1A301 DESIGN GENERATE A DESIGN SPEC FOR EACH
SPECIFICATIONS ITEM OF HARDWARE AT THE SYSTEM,
SUBSYSTEM AND COMPONENT LEVEL
1A302 RELIABILITY DEVELOP RELIABILITY PRODICTION A. DELETE ALL PREDICTIONS A. UNDESIRABLE SINCE CANNOT PERFORMPREDICTIONS MODELS-AND PREDICTIONS FOR THE TRADE STUDIES, MAINTAINABILITYSYSTEM ANALYSES AND LOGISTICS PLANNING
- UPDATED BY DESIGN EVOLUTION
- MODELED DOWN TO THE COM- B. PERFORM PREDICTIONS TO THE EX- B. GENERA TING PREDICTIONS TO VERY DE-
PONENT LEVEL TENT NECESSARY TO SUPPORT TAILED LEVELS AND GENERATING COM-
- TRADESTUDIES PLEX MODELS INTERNAL TO BLACK
- MAINTAINABILITY ANAL YSES BOXES IS EXPENSIVE AND OF QUESTION-
- LOGISTICS PLANNING ABLE VALUE. PREDICTIONS SHOULD BE
DO NOT UPDATE MINOR DESIGN TO SUFFICIENT LEVELS TO SUPPORT CON-
CHANGES OR GENERATE COMPLEX FIGURATIONS TRADES, REDUNDANCY
MODELS INTERNAL TO BLACK ALLOCATIONS, REL/COST STUDIES, M
BOXES ANAL YSES, SPARES AND LOGISTICS
PLANNING ONLY
1A303 FAILURE MODE, PROVIDE DETAILED FMEA'S AT THE A. DELETE REQUIREMENT FOR PROBLEM A. PROBABILITY OF OCCURANCE IS OF
EFFECT, & CRITICALLY SYSTEM, SUBSYSTEM AND COM- OF OCCURENCE FOR ALL BUT SINGLE LIMITED PRACTICAL VALUE AND IN-
ANALYSIS PONENT LEVELS POINT FAILURES VOLVES SIGNIFICANT ENGINEERING
EFFORT
B. PERFORM FMEA'S WITHIN A "BLACK B. DETAILED FMEA'S WITHIN A BLACK BOX
BOX" FOR ALL CRITICAL FUNCTIONS ARE EXPENSIVE AND UNNECESSAR Y FOR
AND TO THE PIECE PART LEVEL FOR BOXES, WHICH, IF THEY FAIL, DO NOT
HAZARDOUS AND MISSION SUCCESS IMPACT MISSION SUCCESS OR PERSONNEL
CRITICALITY FAILURES ONL Y SAFETY
C. DO NOT SUBMIT FORMAL REPORT. C. MANY WORKSHEETS REQUIRE REPORT TO
KEEP WORKSHEETS FOR DOCUMEN- SUMMARIZE, FORM CONCLUSIONS AND
TATION MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS
D. LIMIT REPORT TO A LIST OF SFP'S D. LOSS OF VISIBILITY WITH LITTLE OR NO
REAL SAVINGS
1A306 PROBLEM/FAILURE D. DELETE GSE FROM FAILURE RE- D. THIS WILL SEVERELY IMPACT THE RELIA-
REPORTING & PORTING SYSTEM BILITY OF LAUNCH CRITICAL GSE
CORRECTION E. INCLUDE LAUNCH CRITICAL GSE E. THIS WILL MAINTAIN THE HIGH RELIABIL-(USED IN LAST 72 HR PRIOR TO ITY REQUIREMENTS FOR LAUNCH CRITICAL
LAUNCH) IN FAILURE REPORTING GSE WHILE ALLOWING A COST EFFECTIVE
SYSTEM & OTHER GSE ONL Y AS APPROACH TO FAILURE CLOSE OUT TO
REQUIRED OTHER GSE
1A307 STANDARDIZATION MAINTAIN AN EFFORT TO STAND-
OF DESIGN PRACTICES ARDIZE & CONTROL DESIGN
PRACTICES & FABRICATION
PROCESSES
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Table 4-3 Reliability Issues (Sheet 3 of 3)
TASK NORMAL EOS ALTERNATIVES REJECTION/SELECTION CRITERIA
RELIABILITY
ENGINEERING (CONT)
1A308 PARTS, DEVICES & IMPLEMENT A PROGRAM COVERING
MATERIALS PROGRAMS SELECTION, REDUCTION IN NUMBER
OF TYPES, SPECIFICATION APPLICA-
TION REVIEW, ANAL YZING FAILURES,
STOCKING & HANDLING METHODS,
ESTABLISHING RELIABILITY REOMTS
FOR ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL
PARTS
TESTING AND RELIABILITY
EVALUATION
1A401 RELIABILITY AS A SEPARATE SECTION OF OR SUB-
EVALUATION PLAN SIDIARY DOCUMENT TO THE RELIA-
BILITY PROGRAM PLAN, THE CON-
TRACTOR SHALL SUBMITA PLAN
OF THE RELIABILITY EVALUATION
PROGRAM
1A402 TESTING COMPONENT QUALIFICATION - SAME AS A NORMAL EXCEPT ELIMINA TE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IS PROVIDED
SIMULATE CONDITIONS WHICH ARE HUMIDITY TESTING ON OUALIFICATION BY GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
MORE SEVERE THAN GROUND, UNITS
LAUNCH AND ORBITAL CONDITIONS SAME AS NORMAL EXCEPT SUBSTITUTE THERMAL VACUUM TEMPERATURE RAMPS
IN ORDER TO LOCATE DESIGN THERMAL CYCLING FOR THERMAL ARE VERY SLOW, THUS THEIR USE AS EFFEC-DEFICIENCIES VACUUM TESTING FOR ALL BUT CORONA TIVE WORKMANSHIP SCREENS FOR ALL BUT
COMPONENT ACCEPTANCE - ENVIRON- SENSITIVE AND HIGH-POWER DEVICES CORONA SUSCEPTIBLE EQUIPMENTS IS
MENTALLY TEST COMPONENTS FOR QUESTIONABLE. MORE EFFICIENT& COST
THE PURPOSE OF LOCATING LATENT EFFECTIVE TO USE THERMAL CYCLING TO
MATERIAL AND WORKMANSHIP DE- DETECT WORKMANSHIP DEFECTS
FECTS IN COMPONENTS OF PROVEN
DESIGN
1A403 RELIABILITY ASSESS SYSTEM RELIABILITY AT
ASSESSMENT ' MILESTONES SPECIFIED IN RELIA-
BILITY EVALUATION PLAN
1A404 RELIABILITY PROVIDE ALL PERTINENT RELIA-
EXISTS TO READINESS BILITY DATA NECESSARY TO SUP-
REVIEW PORT EACH PROJECT MILESTONE
REVIEW
1A405 RELIABILITY AT APPROPRIATE MILESTONES INTEGRATE WITH DESIGN REVIEWS & ALLOWS ADEQUATE REVIEW& AUDIT OF RE-
EVALUATION PROGRAM SCHEDULED IN THE RELIABILITY OTHER PROGRAM MILESTONES. CON- LIABILITY PROGRESS & IS COORDINATED
REVIEWS PROGRAM PLAN THE CONTRACTOR DUCTADDITIONAL REVIEWS ONLY WITH OTHER PROGRAM EFFORTS
SHALL REVIEW HIS RELIABILITY WHEN SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS OCCUR
EVALUATION EFFORT
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Table 4-4 Quality Assurance Issues
NHB 53004 (IB)
STUDY ISSUES NORMAL APPROACH EOS ALTERNATIVES
18102-(1) THE OPERATIONS & WORK OF THE CONTRACTOR TEST& INSPECTION VERIFICATION BY GOVERNMENT
ACTIONS & PREROGATIVES & HIS SUPPLIERS ARE SUBJECT TO EVALUATION, INSPECTION AGENCY TO BE ONA POST-AUDITBASIS TO
OF THE GOVERNMENT REVIEW, AUDIT,SURVEY, & INSPECTION BY THE REDUCE COST& ELIMINATE DELAY.
NATED GOVERNGMENT QUINSTALITY ONE& ITS DRESENTATIVE POST-AUDIT PERMITS GRUMMAN TO MOVE AHEAD IN THEMANUFACTURING/TEST CYCLE WITH MONITORING BY
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTA TI VE
1B706-(2) REQUIRES DOCUMENTATION OF CONTINUOUS DETERMINE TRACEABILITY REQUIREMENT ON BASIS OF
INSPECTION & TEST HISTORY OF EQUIPMENT BY UPDATING EACH NEED. DISTINGUISH BETWEEN:'
RECORDS SYSTEM &SUBSYSTEM RECORD * CRITICAL STRUCTURAL ITEMS
* LIMITED LIFE/CYCLE ITEMS
* MATCHED ITEMS REQUIRING REPLACEMENT IN PAIRS
* ROUTINE, LESS COMPLEX ITEMS
1B804-(1) REQUI RES ESTABLISHMENT OF A THREE MEMBER INTRODUCEA SIMPLIFIED MA TERIAL REVIEWSYSTEM
MATERIAL REVIEW BOARD BOARD FOR DISPOSITIONING NON-CONFORMANCES TAILORED TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DEFECT& ITEM
CRITICALITY. DELEGATE RESPONSIBILITY TO A SINGLE
(ENGINEERING) AUTHORITY. OUALITY ASSURANCE WILL
IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION. GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTATIVE WILL EXERCISE JURISDICTION ON
POST-AUDIT BASIS
1 B302-(2) SPECI FY THE EFFECTIVITY POINT OF ASSURE TIMEL Y DISTRIBUTION OF WORKING PROCEDURES
CHANGE CONTROL DOCUMENTS & CHANGES WHICH AFFECT & MONITOR BY QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDITS
MATERIALS, FABRICATION, OR PERFORMANCE
1 B604
WORKMANSHIP STAN DARDS REQUI RES STANDARDS TO BE JOINTLY GRUMMAN WILL SELECT STANDARDS STANDARDS WILL
SELECTED BY NASA & GRUMMAN BE SUBJECT TO CONTINUING NASA REIVEW
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4.5 TESTING PHILOSOPHY
Study Alternatives
The trade studies performed in support of the selection of the recommended approach
are documented in Report No. 3, Subsection 6.18.2.
4.6 DOCUMENTATION AND CONTROLS
In the course of the EOS System definition study, Grumman has examined alternative
low cost management techniques in the area of documentation and controls. Our basic goal
in this study is to recommend approaches that can provide NASA with visibility of EOS de-
velopment progress during Phases C and D and enhance mutual confidence without excessive
documentation and control. The recommendations in this section, if implemented, will
provide NASA with all of the basic information it needs to measure and guide Program per-
formance, while simplifying and reducing the corollary cost of documentation review, order-
ing, delivery, storage and retrieval, specification requirements, configuration baselining
and change control.
STUDY APPROACH - Everyone "knows" that data/documentation and management control
costs are high. No-one has yet been able to realistically determine a workable method for
evaluating the cost effectiveness of a given item of documentation in the face of its "cham-
pion" claiming that he absolutely had to have it. Moreover there are few in Government or
industry who can stand up to the challenge that lack of a given item of data could result in
catastrophic loss of an aircraft or spacecraft worth millions of dollars.
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4How then does one approach the generation of a set of recommendations to a govern-
ment agency for reductions to documentation and control costs ? After due deliberation, we
decided to approach the subject in a frontal manner. We asked ourselves the following
questions:
* What are applicable documentation and control costs and why are they so high?
* How are the requirements for documentation and controls established? What
could be done by NASA, and by contractors, to arrest the proliferation of docu-
mentation ?
* What practical changes to typical documentation and control requirements couldbe made to minimize cost without impact to essential program control and visibil-ity?
We applied these questions to a variety of source information related to present and
past Grumman contract data requirements in many DOD and NASA contracting situations
including:
* Requests for Proposal and resultant contract data/documentation requirementslists and descriptions
* Past studies on reduction of data/paperwork conducted by Grumman
* Cost reduction and value improvement proposals submitted by Grumman on
several DOD Programs
* A summary of lessons learned during the NASA Lunar Module Program
* Studies conducted under the auspices of industry associations such as AOA andEIA on data reduction and data pricing
* The Harbridge House Study of Requirements for Data and Management ControlSystems in Three Engineering Development Programs
* Studies conducted in-house in conjunction with specification of requirements in adesign-to-cost environment.
We then evaluated the material gathered and summarized our findings in response to
the questions posed above. The evaluation was done in a qualitative rather than a quanti-
tative framework using our best judgment as to potential savings in cost since a quantita-
tive analysis of recommendations of this type is highly subjective and therefore suspect.
We want our suggestions to be evaluated on the basis of good management sense rather
than on the validity of mathematical computations or assumptions.
From these findings we formulated the specific recommendations to be made to NASA
with regard to the EOS Phases C and D.
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4FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - Our findings and recommendations are summarized
and discussed in this section. Because of the many overlapping and inter-related areas in
which they could be expressed, we have chosen to group our conclusions under the following
broad categories which correspond to the subparagraphs that follow:
* Documentation Requirements
* Requirements Specification
* Baseline and Change Controls (See Subsection 4.7)
DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS
Recognizing that the most effective means of reducing cost is to eliminate the require-
ments altogether, the first topic we addressed was the methodology of establishing the re-
quirements for documentation in the first place under the heading:
"Requirements Establishment and Ordering Techniques"
Secondly, since we know that costs of documentation and controls are perturbed by
the rigidity/flexibility of format of the documentation required to be submitted to the NASA
under the contractually imposed requirements. We attacked this subject under the heading:
"Documentation Formats and Management Systems Requirements"
Finally, a significant cost driver is the processing and handling of the documentation
itself by both the Contractor and NASA. We discuss this subject, which includes the sub-
mittal approval/disapproval mechanics and the appropriate levels of NASA involvement in
documentation approval, under the heading:
"Documentation Processing and Review"
REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHMENT AND ORDERING TECHNIQUES - The "business-as-
usual" method of determining the documentation required to be furnished to the Govern-
ment during the course of the performance of a contract occurs in one of two (2) ways:
* The Government, in its RFP, specifies documentation requirements on a Con-
tract Data Requirements List (CDRL), DD Form 1423 or equivalent, to which the
Contractor responds in his proposal, and the Government furnishes the final list,
after some negotiation, with the Contract.
* The Contractor is requested to furnish the data list in his proposal; the Govern-
ment reviews it, and after negotiation, furnishes the final list with the Contract.
* In either case, documentation is required to be furnished for approval or informa-
tion to a cited format, to a specific or event-related schedule, and to a given dis-
tribution list.
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4Several factors determine the "tailoring" of requirements to supply only the minimum
"essential" information.
* There is an inherent tendency to overspecify data needs at the early stage of aprogram life cycle when compiling these requirements from "shopping" listsderived from previous programs. "If it was ordered before, I must need it,
although I am not sure at this point, why", or "I may need this information if.... "-
contingency data for which the contingency may be remote and never occur.
* The Contractor is hesitant to dispute with the Government at a time when he is a
candidate for a contract. Playing it safe is the general rule. DOD and NASA are
as like good businessman negotiating for as much as possible for their dollar, often
with several contractors simultaneously.
* After contract award, attempts to eliminate data by the Contractor meet with re-
sistance. There is usually at least one user who can staunchly claim that he
"needs" the item of documentation, and he is probably correct since he has plannedhis work pattern in anticipation of receiving it. Further, when eliminating docu-
mentation, it is difficult to determine the "real" cost savings
* Present methods of forecasting documentation needs in RFP's and contracting for
them long before the true need for information often results in poor "timingf' of
the delivery requirements and adds to the work effort without providing the user
the information when he really needs it.
A conclusion that may be reached from the above is that the usual methods of estab-
lishing and ordering data, while designed to provide a methodical process giving visibility
and control, do not generally inhibit documentation excess and proliferation.
The following recommendations, offered for consideration, address this area of docu-
mentation requirements establishment and ordering techniques:
Recommendation 1
Limit the documentation ordered at contract award to the unique legally (procurement
regulation) mandated items, the key documents obviously required for approval by NASA
and an accession list of all other data prepared by the Contractor as a by-product of his
work scope.
Recommendation 2
Conduct review and "tailoring" of documentation requirements to the specific program
needs after the contractor selection and before finalization of the contract when the Contractor
is free from the pressure of competition and NASA is freed from the requirement to keep
things equal between competitors.
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Recommendation 3
Utilize Deferred Ordering of the other information wherein the Procuring activity
identifies in the contract the types of documentation by subject, not in detail, which might
be ordered later, and/or Deferred Requisitioning wherein the procuring activity uses the
contractor as a documentation depository, ordering copies as needed.
(1) Adjustments in timing can be made.
(2) Substitution of other available information better suited to the users needs perhaps
can be determined.
Recommendation 4
In lieu of Requirements I and 2, provide a NASA/Contractor review of documentation
requirements (forward looking) concurrent with technical design review process to scrub
and revise the contract requirements as the program unfolds, using this approach:
(1) Items that are "Now apparently" not needed can be eliminated.
(2) The need for contingency items can be determined with greater accuracy.
Recommendation 5
Encourage "data minimization" by providing incentives within NASA as well as the
Contractor for reduction of formal documentation in favor of other means of acquiring
equivalent information.
DOCUMENTATION FORMATS AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS - One rea-
son that documentation costs are typically high is the expenditure of resources to formalize
reports, test data, specifications, procedures, manuals, and plans. Documentation costs
are incurred both directly and indirectly. The costs directly associated with providing
specified data, such as the in-house identification and validation functions, are relatively
obvious. Less obvious are the costs associated with requirements to.comply with the multi-
tude of management information and control systems which may be required indirectly in
order to satisfy individual data requirements. Time and resources devoted to marginally
necessary systems and their attendant documentation preclude the contractor from spending
them on the mainstream development effort which is the effort being monitored by the "Sys-
tem" in the first place.
This is not to say that management controls are not needed, and that no specific data
requirements should be imposed. However, the rigidity of format could be considerably
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4relaxed. Data requirements should reflect the minimum acceptable documentation that will
supply the user with the depth and content of the information he needs. The Contractor
should be able to satisfy most of the requirements with information that is a normal output
of the management/design/development/production effort performed using generally good
business practices. When the Government imposes management system requirements on
the Contractor that force him to use formats that are not suitable for his in-house use with-
out rearranging his standard business practices, he overlays added work scope and creates
in effect two overalpping reporting systems which devour manpower.
In any Government/industry program, there is a significant amount of verbal and
other informal exchange of information between Government and Contractor personnel at all
levels. This less formal communication, often documented as a memo of a telephone con-
versation, etc., results in as many decisions, or more, perhaps than formal documentation
often delayed by matters of syntax and semantics. Face-to-face verbal discussion pro-
motes the mutual trust, respect and teamwork that is an EOS Program objective, rather
than the adversary management attitude that is inherent in more formal communications.
There are a number of areas where rigid format requirements can be relaxed with
no adverse effect on the contract performance, end product use, or supportability. One
such area is the Engineering Drawing requirements. All DOD and NASA contracts specify
detailed military drawing requirements, e. g., MIL-STD-100 and MIL-D-1000 and attendant
subsidiary specifications for microfilm ability, readability, abbreviations, types of paper,
and definition, as reflected in Fig. 4-1. This diagram illustrates the breakdown into sub-
sidiary military specifications of MIL-D-1000, Engineering Drawings and Associated Lists.
Contractors and subcontractors involved in the manufacture of more sophisticated
hardware today, whether for the Government use or not, find it an absolute necessity to de-
velop a good set of drawings to good standards if their product is to be built in-house or
produced in whole or in part by a subcontractor. Review' of their drawings reveals that
they are suitable for performing their function of communicating technical information
necessary for manufacturing the product, and that they can be readily microfilmed. Whether
fourth generation microfilm will be legible as required by the MIL-SPECS is a moot point.
That requirement is a cost driver that should be summarily eliminated. The myriad of
similar non-essential requirements, illustrated by Fig. 4-2 are typical of the factors that
drive many qualified contractors away from Government-related business. It is costly but
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UU-P-561 MIL-STD-100 CCC-C-531 MIL-M-9868 MIL-D-5480 MIL-Q-9858 MIL-STD-143
L-F-315 I -F-320 PPP-B-636 MIL-M-38761* FED STD 125 MIL-STD-100 MIL-STD-105 MIL-STD-129
4 I I I I 4
G-C-116 UU-Po31 PPP-B-636 MIL-P-116 MIL-M-9868 MIL-C-9877 I MIL-P-9879
MIL-C-9949 MIL-L-10547 MIL-STD-105 MIL-STD-129 MIL-STD-804 MS 21319 MIL HDBK 303
Five or more levels of subsystem specifications and standards involved
wholly or in part by citing one MIL-SPEC.
4-10 Fig. 4-1 Contract Management/Contract Configuration Management Plan
DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCT
SPECIFICATIONS
REQUIREMENTS
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS TEST REQUIREMENTS
SUBSIDIARY
SPECIFICATIONS
MATERIAL/PROCESS COMPONENT & TEST
SPECIFICATIONS PART SPECIFICATIONS SPECIFICATIONS
-- - [-
COST
DRIVERS * SIZE
* NO. OF PARTS * COMPLEXITY * SPECIAL METHODS * STRINGENT CRITERIA * STRINGENT METHODS
* TOLERANCES I * MATERIAL CONTROLS * TEST QUANTITY * TEST QUANTITY
* MATERIALS * INSPECTION * PART QUALITY * EQUIPMENT ACCURACY
* ACCEPTANCE I I * SYSTEM RELIABILITY
NON-RECURRING
COST
TOOLING TEST2COST DESIGN EQUIPMENT2 VELOPMENT & TEST OST SCOSTSOPM ENGINEERING COSTS 35%4 3%
RECURRING
COSTS NOTE: PERCENTAGES APPLY TO ONE SPECIFIC EXAMPLE.
PRODUCTION
COST
00%
Fig. 4-2 Costs of a Product Related to Specification REquirements
4-11
necessary to maintain an overhead staff just to understand and keep abreast of the require-
ments. Furthermore, the format rigidity required by military formats require personnel
training, changes for correction of non-technical format errors, consume added prepara-
tion and checking time, and yet add nothing of substance to the Program.
Another area loosely falling under the category of format is the storage and retrieval
functions of documentation management and the media of transmittal. Today's microform
technology has progressed to the point where it is highly economical to store, retrieve and
transmit information in this form.
With a minimum complement of equipment available to the contractors and the pro-
curing activity, a significant savings in storage space, reproduction time, and transmittal
time can be realized. A 100 page document, for example, if stored by the contractor in
microfilm form can be reproduced and put in the mail in minutes.
Many of the recommendations we are making in this section run counter to a trend
that has been advocated in the DOD recently for the treatment of deliverable documentation
similarly to the treatment of hardware. Those concerned with the institution of such sys-
tems as MILSCAP, for example, have attempted to institute individual data item pricing and
delivery via DD-250. In addition there have been several drafts circulated to industry for
review which expand the quality assurance provisions of such specifications as MIL-Q-9858,
to cover data item quality.
In our judgement, these requirements are unnecessary. They add to the administra-
tive burden of documentation, and add controls that are not cost-effective. There is little
possibility that personnel assigned to perform documentation quality functions will be tech-
nically qualified to realistically evaluate the content of the documentation. Their contribu-
tion will largely regress to one of format and syntax evaluation and will delay and add to the
cost of the communication of information. To require DD-250's for data items, is, in our
opinion, a waste of resources that could be more productively spent.
To formalize this discussion in the form of specific recommendations, we offer the
following:
Recommendation 6:
Emphasis should be placed on maximum use of Contractor format whenever it can
fulfill the "intent" of the documentation or system requirement of NASA.
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4Recommendation 7:
Documentation requirements should take into consideration the regular review,
monthly status meetings, etc. which take place as a forum for transmitting the needed in-
formation rather than via formal reports. Minutes of such meetings could supplement
many 'Ilata items ".
Recommendation 8:
Utilize informal working documentation - the same material that the Contractor's
engineers used to make.their decisions - in lieu of formal reports. Some examples of
this information might be engineers notebooks, engineering layouts and raw data sheets.
Good engineers often keep copies of their notes, but abhor report writing. Good data
need not be "pretty" to do the job, and NASA personnel are technically competent to review
the same data and make their conclusions in an "over-the-shoulder" or "on-the-board"
environment.
Recommendation 9:
Specify Engineering Drawing requirements to industry standards rather than strict
Government requirements. Examples where drawing requirements can be modified are as
follows:
o Use of Engineering layouts in lieu of formal assembly and installation drawings
* Elimination of margins and zones on engineering layouts
* Eliminating rivet length callout on drawings for rivets which measure less than
1" in length.
* Less restrictive reproducibility requirements for paper copies (Reference
MIL-D-5480, Para. 3.2.1)
- allowing full legibility of first generation copies in lieu of fourth generation.
Recommendation 10:
Replace conventional hard copy transmittal of documentation, wherever practicable,
with microfiche. This recommendation is particularly applicable in conjunction with the
deferred ordering or accessioning of documentation.
Recommendation 11:
Do not implement requirements for more Quality Assurance imposed on documenta-
4-20
4tion and do not require DD-250's (or equivalent) for documentation. The recommended
direction is to reduce this type of requirement, not increase it.
DOCUMENTATION PROCESSING AND REVIEW - Every time a data item is specified as
required to be furnished to the Government, a chain of data management activities is trig-
gered. Of course, if a subcontractor is involved, the process is further complicated.
Traditionally, there are too many data items required for approval, or to state it
another way, approval of documentation takes place at too low a level of detail. Approval
of higher level documents which, for example, control the performance parameters of the
Spacecraft, is of course required. However, lower level documentation serves NASA's
surveillance role and either reinforces or diminishes its confidence in the Contractor.
NASA approval or disapproval of specific items of documentation in no way abrogates the
Contractor's responsibility to meet his contractual performance requirements. However,
the approval process bears added administrative expense on both parties and can cause de-
lays to events that are contingent upon the data's approval. There is no reason why docu-
mentation submitted for information cannot be used for decision-making purposes as effec-
tively as documentation submitted for approval.
Among the areas typically overspecified in terms of approval requirements are:
* Engineering Drawings
* Non-Standard Parts
* Equipment Performance and Test Specifications, Plans and Procedures
On many contracts, contractor-prepared design concept drawings, manufacturing
drawings and all changes thereto are signed by the Government's Representative before
release and manufacture of parts. Even though they have signed the manufacturing draw-
ings, the Government has not approved them but merely allowed the Contractor to release
them. The Contractor is still required to meet the total requirements of the Systems
Specification. During the course of a development/production program, there are always
a significant number of changes to initial releases. Deleting this signature requirement
from all but the design concept (layouts) would eliminate an unnecessary administrative
cost. The Government Representative is in no way inhibited from exercising his surveil-
lance function if he is on distribution of copies for information. His contribution, however,
would be on a non-interference basis - exercised only when he determines that approved
design concepts are being deviated from.
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4In the area of Non-standard parts, tube, diode and transistor complements, etc.,
there are too many iterations during RDT&E projects to make.this documentation worth-
while prior to a point of design stabilization. Due to the many changes during the course
of the program many parts initially selected will be weeded out as a result of testing. The
customer reviews numerous parts at present that will not be utilized in the final design,
Specifications are covered in the next section of this report (7. 2. 2).
Our documentation processing and review recommendations are as follows:
Recommendation 12:
All contractual data/documentation requirements should be carefully screened by
NASA prior to imposition on the contractor to assure that documentation that does not
directly affect NASA's interests or has a higher level requirement controlling it be sub-
mitted for information rather than for approval.
Recommendation 13:
Only design concept drawings should be specifically signed and approved by NASA.
Manufacturing drawings should not require Government Representative signature as such
signature does not connote approval and does not relieve the Contractor of his overall re-
sponsibilities.
REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION
For a given procurement, be it NASA procuring from a contractor, or a contractor
purchasing from a subcontractor, the way the requirements for the item being purchased
are specified can have a dramatic impact on the cost of the item. The cost can be incurred
to a greater or lesser degree dependent upon the following factors:
* The choice of the type of specification and the matching of the content to the
specification function
* The level of customer involvement and approval
In addition to these factors, there are, of course, savings that can be realized by in-
telligent specification preparation practices which minimize the cost of maintaining the
documents as changes occur.
SPECIFICATION TYPES AND CONTENTS
MIL-STD-490 and MIL-S-83490 are the standards of the industry regarding specifica-
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4tions. They specify and provide outlines for five basic types of specifications, A - System,
B - Development, C - Product, D- Process and E - Material.. In addition, the first types A
and B are subdivided into the following subsidiary types:
Development Specs Product Specs
*B1 - Prime Item *Cla - Prime Item Function
*B2 - Critical Item *Clb - Prime Item Fabrication
B3 - Non Complex Item *C2a - Critical Item Function
B4 - Facility or Ship *C2b - Critical Item Fabrication
B5 - Computer Program C3 - Non Complex Item Fabrication
C4 - Inventory Item
C5 - Computer Program
These types represent a "shopping list" from which the appropriate specifications for
a given situation are chosen. For purposes of our discussion, we have focused on the follow-
ing specifications, and in particular those in the first two categories which are asterisked
above:
Development Specifications - Define the "design-to" requirements for an item to be
developed. The essence of this type of specification is the item's performance, form
factor and other pertinent technical considerations
Product Specifications - In addition to the performance and design requirements
these specs define the "build to" and "test-to" requirements. They may be part II
of a two-part specification, the first part of which is the Development Spec.
Materials and Process Specifications - State the requirements for materials and
techniques and procedural requirements applicable to materials or fabrication pro-
cesses. These are subsidiary specifications which are referred to in the higher
tier specifications or on the implementing engineering drawings. Test specifications
are included in this category.
The factors (cost drivers) which are controlled via these specifications and impact
the ultimate cost of the item being procured, are illustrated in Figure 4-2. In the typical
case examined, an estimate of the non-recurring and recurring (production) cost pertur-
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4bated by the stringency of the requirements specified in the Development/Product and sub-
sidiary Material, Process and Test Specifications is broken down as follows:
Non-Recurring Cost:
Tooling (20%) Dependent upon the complexity of the design and the depth
of detail to which it is specified. If the Contractor has
sufficient design freedom he may be able to reduce the
testing cost.
Design, Develop- Dependent upon the stringency of the requirements for de-
ment, and Test sign and test criteria and the Quality and Reliability require-
Engineering (43%) ments stated in the specifications. Costs will vary depend-
ing on the Contractors capability to meet the requirements
as specified. It is axiomatic that if he is given freedom to
determine the "how", he can utilize his capability in the
most efficient manner.
Recurring Cost:
(100% Production Dependent on the design, tolerances, materials and accept-
Costs) ance test requirements. The more stringent and restrictive
these requirements are, the higher the cost will be.
There is a tendency when preparing specifications to overspecify the requirements
based on the technical knowledge of the preparer and on his experience. This detail is
practical and appropriate when an item is being reprocured, and must be identical. But
when development of an item is being procured, broader, non-restrictive requirements
enable the Seller to make most efficient use of his capabilities. This is particularly im-
portant in a design-to-cost environment. On one recent program, which covered a broad
range of equipment including missile, optical, armament, computers, and displays, pro-
curement costs for sub-contracted items were reduced by an average of 20% by substituting
"functional" requirements for the detailed design requirements originally specified.
We offer the following recommendations related to specification-type and content:
Recommendation 14:
Whenever possible, utilize Functional specifications stating performance only as
opposed to Detailed Design Requirements in accordance with the following guidelines:
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4Use Development (Design Control) Specifications for any item below the system level
whenever it is considered sufficient to specify performance only (as opposed to fabrication).
Normally, the design control specification is used when:
* A single procurement (that is, one source) is anticipated or when training and
logistic considerations are not important, or control of interchangeability of in-
ternal parts is either unnecessary or not desired.
* It is necessary to specify performance as a first step in developing a product
fabrication (detail design) specification. The transition to a fabrication specifica-
tion is greatly facilitated by the existence of a development (design control) specifi-
cation.
Performance requirements should be stated in quantitative terms only, that is, in
terms of numerical inputs and outputs including permissible tolerances undervarious oper-
ating conditions as applicable. The reason for this is that:
* This is the only way performance values and tolerances can be established and
verified for use in the attendant test or checkout procedure. In the case of the
specification defining the preproduction configuration, these values and their tol-
erances serve as the basis for establishing the performance criteria of the equip-
ment under the various environmental conditions of the qualification test.
Any development specification should be void of "how-to" design details since such
details will only inhibit the designer's function by telling him how to do something
instead of stating the end result he is required to achieve. This type of informa-
tion belongs in the fabrication specification. The development specification should
not contain philosophy and descriptive matter but should instead devote itself to
exact statements based on a black-box concept, that is, list only inputs, outputs,
and interfaces without concern for principles of operation. An exception is when
for a valid technical reason part of all of the detail design has to be dictated. In
general, specification of design details should be kept to a minimum.
Product Fabrication (Detail Design) Specifications are applicable to any item below
the system level (including computer hardware), and are oriented toward procurement of a
product through specification of primarily fabrication (detail design) requirements. This'
specification should be used for second source procurement, or re-procurement, that is,
when it is necessary to make available a design disclosure package, to control the inter-
changeability of lower-level components and parts, and when service, maintenance and
training are significant factors. This specification shall state:
(a)A detailed description of the parts and assemblies of the product, usually by pre-
scribing compliance with a set of drawings.
(b) Those performance requirements and corresponding tests and inspections neces-
sary to. assure proper fabrication, adjustment, and assembly techniques.
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4In those cases where a development (design control) specification has been prepared,
specific reference to the document containing the performance requirements for the item
shall be made in the fabrication specification. Tests normally are limited to acceptance
tests in the shop environment consisting of selected performance requirements and verify-
ing tests. Preproduction-type or periodic tests to be performed on a sampling basis and
requiring service, or other enivironment may reference the associated development spe-
cification.
Recommendation 15:
Eliminate "How-to" information from Process Specification leaving the methodology
to the selection of the subcontractor. Whenever possible, reference broader Military or
NASA documents in lieu of contractor process specification.
A contractor process specification is required only when the customer specification
covering the applicable requirements is not detailed enough for the required process con-
trol. The process specification is essentially a general specification and is therefore
applicable only to the extent specified on the design drawing or in the equipment specifica-
tion. Manufacturing or process specifications should not be referenced to the point of in-
hibiting manufacturing technology or initiative. By imposing detailed specifications on
sellers, for instance, the seller may be forced to deviate from his normal methods with
no actual improvement in the end result. In all cases the emphasis should be on design
conformance not methodology, keeping in mind that the purpose of a drawing upon which
the process spec is referenced, is not to control production but rather to control the de-
sign configuration and to present the criteria for determining whether the item conforms
to the stated requirements.
Recommendation 16:
Encourage the reduction of testing, assessment and analysis when advantage can be
taken of previous work of a similar nature.
Recommendation 17:
Eliminate or greatly reduce whenever feasible general specifications for such things
as Human Factors, Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, etc. and substitute broader func-
tional requirements giving the seller flexibility in how he will demonstrate meeting them.
This procedure will also reduce specification maintenance cost. A general specification
covers requirements common to two more types, classes, grades, or styles of products,
services, or materials. This avoids repetition of common requirements in other specifica-
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tions. It also permits changes to common requirements to be readily effect ed. General
specifications may also be used to cover common requirements for weapon systems and
subsystems, such as reliability, maintainability, human factors weight control programs,
etc., as well as sealing, watertightness, and certain finish requirements.
One of the most important things to remember about this type of specification, if it
is to be imposed on sellers, is that the temptation to reorganizethe seller's house must be
resisted. In most cases, the sellers are capable of complying with general requirements
imposed on them. As a rule, it is far more economical to be general enough to permit the
seller to use his own detailed organizational setups and methods as long as he meets the
end requirements. To require the seller to do everything the buyers way can be phenom-
enally costly. In addition, the use of general specifications require extreme care in the
following areas:
(a) Whenever reference is made to general specifications in equipment or other
specifications, such reference should be made by specific paragraph number.
Theoretically, it is true that if you say "welding shall be in accordance with
SPG024", it is intended that he comply with whatever paragraph of that specifi-
cation deals with welding. He usually suspects, however, that the welding re-
quirements may be scattered (and unfortunately he is usually right) and therefore
hangs a high price tag on the item to cover the requirements that he hasn't found
yet. Also, requirements traceability is greatly aided by referencing specific
paragraph numbers.
(b) Unless these documents are carefully written it becomes difficult to separate
a technical task from its associated data task. If for some reason the two tasks
are not properly separated, a downstream economy measure to, for example,
eliminate the data requirement may result in elimination of both tasks without
intending to do so. For instance, a general reliability specification may contain
a paragraph with the heading "3.2.1 Failure Analysis Report". If both the
technical and the associated data requirement are stated in this paragraph,
elimination of the report from the purchase order would automatically eliminate
the technical task of conducting failure analysis as well as the report. To avoid
this problem, the two requirements must be separated as follows:
"3.2.1 Failure Analysis. -
3.2.2 Failure Analysis Report. -"
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4CUSTOMER APPROVAL LEVELS
The discussion of the appropriate level of approval of specifications follows generally
the argument advanced above. Recognizing that the degree of customer involvement in the
affairs of a contractor is related to the degree of risk that the Government can accept, we
do not advocate reduction of government cognizance over areas in which his interest is in-
volved. Rather our recommendations deal with the review and approval of specification
requirements which are a level below those which protect the Government's interest.
Fir .4-3, .Docment Control Levels, illustrates this point. The specification at
the subsystem level contains all of the performance requirements necessary for Govern-
ment approval, and the Government will accept or reject the contractor's delivered items
on this basis. There is in reality little to be gained by Government approval of specifica-
tions below this level. Surveillance and visibility can still be retained, but the time-delay-
ing repetitive effort in reviewing and approving iterating requirements allocated to these
lower levels can be eliminated. Government participation in such activities as the con-
tractor's configuration reviews and audits of his sellers can provide a more meaningful
barometer of design progress and requirements compliance.
Recommendation 18:
Limit customer approval to System/Subsystem Level, with Contractor control on the
Black-Box (Equipment) Specification level. This will provide greater flexibility and timeli-
ness in contractor-subcontractor relations and will contribute to lower costs. The Sys-
tem and Subsystem Level Specifications should contain only top-level performance and
interface requirements with the lower tier documents being selectively more detailed.
4.7 BASELINES AND CONFIGURATION CONTROL
In any discussion on cost saving methods of documentation and controls, the subject
of changes and change controls cannot be ignored. For regardless of initial contract cost,
if good controls are not placed on changes, the costs will escalate. This is not to say that
changes should be avoided. Some are necessary, and are beneficial to the program. Some
changes can reduce the acquisition cost of the product, or its total life cycle costs.
In the normal application of Configuration Management to a program emphasis is
often placed on obtaining a product baseline as early as possible to have full control of the
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4configuration and all changes and thus hold down costs. This misconception, as we will
see, is the very reason some past programs have been caught in a time-wasting and costly
change mill.
Experience on many aerospace programs of varying scope and complexity over the
past 10 to 15 years has shown us the types of change board activities on both the contractor
and the Government that are efficient and effective, and those which "prolong the agony. "
Grumman's advocacy of an early-in-the-game "joint" board stems from our confidence in
ourselves and our philosophy of frankness and openness with our customer.
OPTIMUM BASELINING - In a well-managed configuration management program, the con-
figuration of the hardware and documentation are known at all times from the first speci-
fication release to the delivery of the last article under the contract, so there is no real
magic to the establishment of a configuration baseline. There are in reality two configura-
tion baselines which evolve as the program progresses: one is the internal contractor
baseline represented by all of the specifications and drawings he has released; the other is
the formal baseline represented by the documentation/hardware approved and accepted by
the customer. To this second baseline, we give names like Functional Allocated and Pro-
duct to represent the level of coverage. The Product Baseline occurs when the two base-
lines merge; i. e., the complete design disclosure package is subject to customer change
control.
If this point is selected too late, the customer loses the ability to make decisions
about changes which may be costly and may impact his associated support training and
operational activities if not the contract costs itself. If chosen too early, an unnecessary
and burdensome "change mill" is created merely because the product was baselined before
the point of design stabilization. The inevitable iterations and changes resulting from in-
itial manufacture and testing are within the province of the contractor's work scope in
meeting his specification requirements. It is only when these changes begin to impact de-
livered equipment (retrofit required), support commodities, logistics, etc., that they
should properly be under the province of customer change control. The precise point in
the program cycle is a variable, highly dependent on individual program circumstances.
It is determined by trading-off the program milestones, i.e., delivery, flight schedule,
testing schedule, against the anticipated change profile, and the need for provisioning,
logistic support and maintenance information. It must be recognized that few programs
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4are ideally paced, -most are constrained by external influences such as operational objec-
tives, mission windows, critical shortages, funding limitations, etc.
Figure 4-4, Optimum Baseline, is a typical aerospace program profile of the re-
lease of drawings and Engineering Orders. The following parameters are plotted:
*' The.release of-drawings tomeet System/Detail Specification requirements
* The release of changes (Engineering Orders) correcting or revising the original
releases in order to meet the Spec requirements
* The release of EO's implementing Class I Changes initiated by the customer or
contractor.
The optimum product baseline occurs at or near the point of design stabilization.
PRODUCT BASELINE
TOO EAR LY
ENGINEERING ORDERS/(TO MEET DETAIL SPECIFICATIONS)
DRAWINGS DRAWING & ENGINEERING ORDERS IMPLEMENTING
APPROVED CLASS I CHANGES (REVISING DETAIL
SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS)
LU.
U-. /
OPTIMUM PRODUCT BASELINE
TIME - - DESIGN
STABILIZATION
OPTIMUM BASELINE OCCURS AT THE POINT OF DESIGN STABILIZA TION. BASELINING TOO EARLY RESULTS IN DESIGNCHANGES (SHADED) BEING SUBJECTED TO UNNECESSARY CHANGE CONTROL.
Fig. 4-4 Optimum Baseline
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4The following recommendations are offered with regard to the establishemnt of the
product baseline.
Recommendation 19:
Select the point in the Program for establishment of the product baseline at or near
the point of design stabilization to avoid an unnecessary and burdensome change mill.
Recommendation 20:
Dependent upon overall program schedule, portions of the system should be base-
l Ll..neA iLl I.ucJ~Lly at ail tLlulll p JUntL LJ0 L4ILL egit~ltL.
Recommendation 21:
Since the program schedule itself is the prime cost driver in the change control
process, exercise caution that the program is properly paced with regard to development
effort and design stabilization.
CONFIGURATION CONTROL - Once a change has been conceived, the longer it takes to
process it, and nurture it to the point of implementation, the costlier it will become.
This is particularly true with changes which correct deficiencies, because while a con-
dition goes uncorrected, progress may be halted, interim solutions and workarounds may
be devised and operating limitations formulated. Lengthy processing results in more
retrofit, which is usually more expensive than implementing a change in the production
flow. Hence it is obvious that speedy processing of changes by both the contractor and
the Government would tend to decease overall costs.
We have found, notably on the OAO, LM and F-14 Programs, that one way to speed
change processing is to provide better and more direct communication on changes. On the
NASA/Grumman OAO Program, Grumman utilized the same changes documentation for
submittal of changes to the procuring activity as it did for processing internal changes.
This procedure has the advantage of simplicity. It also eliminates the requirement of re-
working a change directive merely for the sake of format.
On LM and F-14, the concept of joint customer and contractor change boards have
been successfully applied. In the later days of the LM Program, the CCB was convened by
conference telephone call in many instances. On the F-14, we have recently instituted a
joint mini-board which convenes regularly to screen potential changes. What this board
accomplishes is to eliminate early in the change process those changes that would eventu-
ally have been disapproved later by the customer.
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Based on these positive experiences, we are ready to offer the following recom-
mendations for EOS consideration:
Recommendation 22:
Establish the System Interpretation Configuration Control Board (SICCB) to review,
discuss and expedite change processing.
Recommendation 23:
The SICCB will screen potential changes prior to the commitment of them to pro-
posal preparation, to determine if the contractor should proceed with further effort or
discontinue.
Recommendation 24:
Conference calls between appropriate NASA and Grumman program managers, with
supporting personnel in attendance at either end of the conversation, can be utilized to
minimize travel and expedite change action.
Recommendation 25:
While rigorous documentation of changes is necessary, we believe that an Engineer-
ing Change Proposal format that is the same as the paperwork used internally for change
processing can be utilized by NASA. This format will be specifically tailored to the
EOS.Program and mutually agreed upon.
Recommendation 26:
In the design-to-cost environment, the S. I. will find changes which reduce cost to
counterbalance proposed changes which increase cost. Cost versus performance and
requirement trade-offs will be made continuously throughout the program.
Recommendation 27:
One reason that change processing in government agencies takes as much time as
it does is the frequent lack of one central fiscal authority over the funding of all aspects
of a change. Though this has been less a NASA problem than, say the Navy, it is a trap
that should be avoided in the future.
Recommendation 28:
Mutual confidence results from the identification, visibility, and prompt solution
to problems. NASA's knowledge that the Contractor is not hiding problems but solving
them, as evidenced in the (SICCB) recommendations, will enhance this confidence and
make excessive documentation and controls unnecessary.
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